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Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the 
Board: Promoting Accountability in 
Corporate Governance 
Renee M. Jones∗ 
ABSTRACT: This Article considers the dominant claim in corporate law 
literature that extra-legal mechanisms such as markets and social norms 
provide adequate safeguards against corporate mismanagement and 
opportunism. After noting recognized deficiencies in the arguments from 
market discipline, the Article draws on psychological insights to show that 
certain behavioral phenomena prevent social norms from appropriately 
constraining corporate conduct. 
It then argues that because neither markets nor social norms can sufficiently 
discipline corporate officials, a credible accountability mechanism is 
necessary to prevent director conduct standards from deteriorating. 
Unfortunately, an inveterate tradition of judicial deference in corporate law 
has undermined the role of fiduciary duty litigation as a mechanism for 
accountability. 
To promote greater accountability in corporate governance, the Article 
recommends reforms to the director liability regime. It argues that litigation 
and settlement practices should require negligent directors to make personal 
payments toward settlements and damage awards, and that such payments 
should be calibrated based on a director’s ability to pay. This proposal 
addresses two main weaknesses in the current director liability regime: (1) 
judicial nullification and (2) legitimacy concerns regarding the scope of 
directors’ liability risks. 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. Significant progress on this Article was 
made during a fellowship at the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics at Harvard 
University. I am grateful to Dennis Thompson, Arthur Applbaum, and seminar participants 
Jeffrey Abramson, Elizabeth Ashford, Thomas Cochrane, Elisabetta Galeotti, Maria Merritt, and 
Daniel Philpott for valuable feedback. I would also like to thank Joseph Badarraco, Mary Bilder, 
Lawrence Cunningham, Joan Heminway, Ray Madoff, Hillary Sale, William Simon, and Lynn 
Stout for helpful comments on early drafts. This Article also benefited from comments from 
participants in faculty colloquia at Northeastern, Boston College, and Washington and Lee law 
schools. Finally, thanks are due to Jason Radford, Jane Morril, Yvonne Chan, and Precious 
Eboigbe for excellent research assistance. © Copyright 2006 by Renee M. Jones. 
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A reduction in penalties for fiduciary breaches should increase the likelihood 
that judges find liability in appropriate instances. Calibrating penalties 
should also improve general perceptions of the legitimacy of corporate law 
rules, and thus support the internalization of proper moral values by 
directors so that they are better motivated to fulfill their fiduciary obligations 
to corporations and their shareholders. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A puzzling aspect of corporate law is the absence of an effective 
enforcement mechanism for the duties of loyalty and care that form its 
traditional foundation. A combination of substantive doctrines and 
procedural requirements embodied in corporate law has made it nearly 
impossible for shareholders to prevail when challenging the decisions and 
practices of corporate management. One wonders how a set of virtually 
unenforceable rules can be expected to influence the actions of corporate 
officers and directors. More broadly, our corporate governance structure 
raises the question of whether a system of legal rules unbuttressed by a 
credible threat of sanction can actually deter the conduct it seeks to control. 
Many prominent scholars argue that formal legal intervention in 
corporate internal affairs is rarely necessary or desirable because market 
forces and social norms adequately constrain managerial conduct. Social 
norms are informal rules and standards enforced through peer-
administered sanctions, such as disapproval, ostracism, or reputational 
injury, or through internal emotions such as guilt or shame. Some scholars 
argue that such internalized values, coupled with the threat of social 
sanctions, appropriately constrain the conduct of corporate officials. 
This Article addresses the question of whether the disciplinary power of 
social norms can replace the threat of legal liability as an effective 
accountability mechanism. After analyzing the complex relationship among 
law, social norms, and conduct in the context of corporate governance, it 
concludes that social norms alone cannot adequately constrain managerial 
conduct. Although social norms have the potential to motivate good 
conduct, they are equally capable of motivating and perpetuating bad 
conduct.1 Psychological and social theory suggests that in order for norms to 
positively influence social behavior they must be supported by an external 
accountability mechanism. Without a reliable accountability mechanism, 
social norms that guide managerial conduct are likely to erode and tolerate 
increasing levels of unethical conduct. 
This Article further argues that the existing liability regime for fiduciary 
duties fails as an accountability mechanism. A tradition of judicial deference 
has created a de facto “no liability” rule which means that directors are 
rarely called upon to justify their actions. The “no liability” regime results 
from a more complex and fundamental problem. The penalties that 
directors face for a breach of duty seem disproportionate in relation to the 
degree of wrongdoing. This draconian liability threat creates two perverse 
effects. First, it is a leading cause of nullification of liability rules by courts 
 
 1. Norms supporting racial and gender discrimination are salient examples of such 
undesirable norms. For additional examples, see JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 139–47 
(1989). 
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and legislatures. Second, the prospect of disproportionate penalties hinders 
the internalization of appropriate moral values by corporate leaders. 
Drawing on insights from psychological literature, this Article 
recommends reforms to the director liability scheme that will address these 
problems. It argues that legal sanctions for fiduciary breaches should be 
modified to better reflect society’s assessment of directors’ degree of 
culpability for harms to the corporation. Drawing on the model provided by 
the recent WorldCom settlement, it suggests that damage awards for 
nonculpable breaches of the fiduciary duty of care be reduced and 
calibrated in a manner that reflects a negligent director’s ability to pay. To 
be effective as a mechanism for accountability, such reform must require 
each negligent director personally pay a portion of the monetary penalty. If 
legal penalties were so calibrated, judges would be more likely to find 
liability in appropriate circumstances and would thus better fulfill their role 
as arbiters of director and executive behavior. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the basic corporate 
law framework and catalogs weaknesses in existing enforcement mechanisms 
that have created a de facto “no liability” rule for corporate directors. Part 
III describes the standard defenses of the “no liability” rule, focusing mainly 
on law and social norms analysis. Part IV critiques the law and norms 
approach, especially as applied to corporate governance. It draws on insights 
from social psychology to demonstrate that the social norms of directors are 
prone to erosion in the absence of an external accountability mechanism. In 
light of the failure of markets and social norms to constrain corporate 
conduct, Part V recommends changes to the corporate liability scheme. It 
recommends a reduction in penalties for a negligent breach of the duty of 
care, accompanied by a requirement that directors contribute personally to 
the payment of penalties assessed for such negligent conduct. 
II. THE “NO LIABILITY” RULE IN CORPORATE LAW 
This Part describes the current corporate law regime in which directors 
of corporations rarely (almost never) personally pay damages or penalties 
for the breach of fiduciary duty or other violations of corporate or securities 
laws. Corporate statutes and jurisprudence wax eloquently regarding the 
solemn duties of directors to exercise due care and work faithfully for the 
exclusive benefit of the corporation. The legal doctrine provides for 
significant penalties for directors who fail to fulfill their duties. In reality, 
however, courts almost never assess damages against directors, and most 
costs and settlements of shareholder litigation are paid by corporations or 
insurance rather than the defendant directors. In this Article, I describe this 
reality as a “no liability” rule—an informal rule that results from the 
combined effect of the substantive doctrine, procedural mechanisms, and 
contractual protections described below. 
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A. THE THEORETICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
State corporate law establishes the legal obligations of corporate 
directors and officers to their corporations and their shareholders (in the 
form of fiduciary duties) and provides a remedy for the breach of such 
duties.2 The federal securities laws also play a significant role in the 
governance of large public corporations.3 However, the prescription of 
directors’ obligations to the corporation itself has traditionally been the 
province of state law. 
The power to direct a corporation’s affairs rests in the board of 
directors. Delaware’s general corporation law is typical in providing that “the 
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors . . . .”4 In most large corporations, 
directors delegate this broad decision-making power to executive officers 
who exercise the bulk of corporate power, subject to oversight by the 
directors.5 
A director’s obligations to the corporation and its shareholders are 
rooted in the concept of fiduciary duty. Directors are bound by fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care.6 In simplest terms, the duty of care requires that 
directors act diligently in managing the corporation’s affairs, while the duty 
of loyalty requires that directors place the interests of the corporation above 
their own. State common law jurisprudence has fleshed out the substance of 
these duties, which tend to be stated in general rather than specific terms. 
 
 2. This discussion focuses on Delaware law, the predominant source of corporate law in 
the country. Except as noted, the same general principles apply under the Model Business 
Corporation Act (the “MBCA”) and significant non-MBCA jurisdictions such as New York and 
California. Twenty-nine states have adopted the MBCA. Four jurisdictions have statues based on 
an earlier version of the Act. A number of other states have adopted selected provisions of the 
Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT xix (2005). 
 3. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–63 (2003) (arguing that securities fraud 
suits have become the “most visible means of regulating corporate governance”). Although the 
risk of liability under securities law is higher, such risks extend principally to executives and 
outside advisers such as accountants, lawyers, or investment banks who face liability as 
secondary actors. Actual monetary payments by nonexecutive directors remain as much a rarity 
under the securities law regime as under corporate law. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying 
text. 
 4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2005). 
 5. Although directors retain exclusive formal authority to initiate or authorize certain 
transactions such as mergers, consolidations, and charter amendments, as a practical matter 
almost all such actions are initiated by management and submitted to the board for formal 
approval. 
 6. A duty of good faith is sometimes recited among the basic fiduciary duties. However, 
the contours of “good faith” as an independent obligation remain poorly defined. See infra 
notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
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1. Duty of Care 
As commonly articulated, the standard of care for corporate directors is 
that of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances, although in 
Delaware the standard of care is gross negligence.7 However, the level of 
judicial scrutiny of board conduct differs significantly from that applied in 
the tort context.8 The lynchpin of this specialized standard of review is the 
business judgment rule, which shields most board decisions from judicial 
scrutiny. Under the business judgment rule, courts limit their inquiry into 
the adequacy of the process by which a board reached its decision, rather 
than the wisdom or appropriateness of the decision itself. Rationality, not 
reasonableness, is the standard by which courts assess director conduct. 
Although courts have been circumspect in reviewing board conduct, 
case law establishes some minimum requirements for directors to fulfill their 
duty of care. The duty of care requires directors to pay at least some 
attention to the affairs of the corporation. Thus, directors can be liable for a 
corporation’s losses if found to have been “asleep at the wheel” or “missing 
in action.”9 The duty of attention is supplemented by a “procedural” duty of 
care which requires directors to act responsibly in making affirmative 
corporate decisions. Smith v. Van Gorkom10 articulated this standard, holding 
that directors must demonstrate that they deliberated in an informed 
manner before reaching the challenged decision. The directors’ failure to 
inform themselves adequately deprives them of business judgment rule 
protection and requires them to show that their decision meets a more 
demanding “fairness” standard.11 
In addition to the duties of attention and reasonable deliberation, 
courts have asserted that directors have a duty to monitor their 
corporation’s compliance with law.12 Under Caremark, directors must make 
efforts to ensure that adequate internal controls exist to detect fraud or 
illegal activities by the corporation’s management and employees.13 
However, under Caremark, if the board has implemented such a policy, the 
 
 7. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984). 
 8. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 288–96 (2000) (discussing the variance 
between standards of liability for directors and other professionals such as doctors or lawyers). 
 9. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981); Hoye v. Meek, 
795 F.2d 893, 894–96 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Oklahoma law). 
 10. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). 
 11. Id. at 893; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). 
 12. Monitoring duties are also imposed by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2000), which requires 
corporations to maintain internal controls adequate to provide reasonable assurance of the 
integrity of the corporation’s financial reporting system. 
 13. In re Caremark Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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business judgment rule forestalls judicial scrutiny into the adequacy or 
reasonableness of the compliance program.14 
2. Duty of Loyalty 
When a director or senior officer transacts business with a corporation, 
the risk of abuse is clear. As both a decision-maker and a potential 
beneficiary, the official faces the temptation to enrich himself at the expense 
of the corporation. To protect the corporation and its shareholders against 
such overreaching, the duty of loyalty requires directors to put the 
corporation’s interests above their own at all times.15 Although corporate law 
once imposed a complete prohibition on self-dealing transactions, over time 
this prohibition yielded to a more deferential standard by which approval or 
ratification by an “independent” decisionmaker shields conflict transactions 
from judicial scrutiny.16 This permissive standard has been codified into 
most state corporate statutes.17 
Section 144 of Delaware’s corporate code is typical. It states that a 
transaction between a director and the corporation is not void solely because 
of the conflict, if the transaction was approved by disinterested directors, 
ratified by shareholders, or if the transaction is fair to the corporation.18 A 
conflict transaction that is approved in the manner prescribed by section 
144 will typically be accorded business judgment rule protection.19 
3. Other Duties 
Although loyalty and care form the bedrock of fiduciary duty, certain 
sub-categories subsumed within these duties are often accorded 
independent treatment. Courts have held that directors owe shareholders a 
duty of full disclosure whenever the board requests that shareholders 
 
 14. Id. at 967–68. Because Caremark does not require an effective compliance program, 
many commentators view this as a weak standard. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State 
Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 345 (2004) (“[T]he 
standard employed by Caremark meant that directors would almost never be liable for a failure 
to monitor . . . .”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate 
Governance, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2003) (asserting that Caremark approved of an 
“incredibly weak system of corporate monitoring”). 
 15. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 16. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. 
LAW. 35, 39–40 (1966). 
 17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.62 (2005); CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 310(a)(1) (1990); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713(a)(1)–(2) (1983). 
 18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144. 
 19. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 
467 (Del. 1991). The effect of section 144 compliance has not been clearly delineated by the 
courts. Although most cases accord such decisions business judgment rule protection, others 
suggest that compliance with section 144 merely shifts the burden of proof regarding the 
transaction’s fairness from the defendants to the plaintiffs. See Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 
11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
JONES_FINAL_REVISED 11/20/2006 4:51:51 PM 
LAW, NORMS, AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BOARD 113 
approve a transaction. Under this “duty of candor,” directors must disclose 
all material facts relevant to any decision the shareholders are asked to 
make.20 
Courts have also hinted at the existence of a free-standing duty of good 
faith that applies to all director action (or inaction) related to their duties to 
the corporation.21 The significance of the good faith obligation rests with 
director exoneration provisions that allow corporations to eliminate director 
liability for certain actions, but forbid exoneration for “acts or omissions not 
in good faith.”22 The contours of this duty of good faith are ill-defined; 
nonetheless, some scholars predict that good faith could play a significant 
role in future jurisprudence, representing an independent source of 
director liability.23 
B. THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
In theory, the shareholder derivative lawsuit serves as the principal 
enforcement mechanism for fiduciary duties.24 The derivative action allows 
shareholders to sue, in the corporation’s name, officers and directors for 
breach of duty. The purpose of this form of action is to ensure an avenue for 
the vindication of the corporation’s rights when those who otherwise control 
the corporation’s decision to sue are implicated in the wrongdoing.25 
A director’s breach of her fiduciary duty theoretically exposes her to 
liability for any damages to the corporation resulting from the breach. Thus, 
a negligent decision that causes $100 million of losses to the corporation 
 
 20. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276–77 (Del. 1994); Stroud v. 
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). In addition, directors violate their duty of disclosure 
whenever they “knowingly disseminate false information” that leads to shareholder injury 
regardless of whether shareholder action is requested. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 
1998); see also GEVURTZ, supra note 8, at 219. 
 21. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(ruling that allegations regarding board inaction in the hiring and subsequent termination of a 
company’s president raised questions as to the good faith of directors). 
 22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see infra notes 37–39 and accompanying 
text. 
 23. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2005); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, The Unimportance of Being 
Earnest: Reflections on Director Liability and Good Faith 17 (Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract=921668); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494 (2004) (examining the doctrine of good faith and recent 
evolution of the duty of good faith). The recent Delaware Supreme Court decision affirming 
the chancery court’s ruling in favor of the directors of Walt Disney Company has squashed 
latent expectations that a duty of “good faith” might serve as a viable basis for director liability. 
See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 
8, 2006); infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 24. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639–40 (1986). A direct class action is 
permitted when directors’ negligence is claimed to have harmed shareholders directly rather 
than the corporation. Id. at 640. 
 25. GEVURTZ, supra note 8, at 387. 
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would expose all directors who approved or acquiesced in such decision to 
joint and several liability for the full $100 million in damages. However, a 
number of protective doctrines effectively insulate directors from any real 
threat of monetary liability. 
First, as mentioned previously, the business judgment rule shields most 
director decisions from review by limiting judicial inquiry into the adequacy 
of the process by which the board reached its decision, rather than the 
wisdom or appropriateness of the decision itself.26 As a general matter, it is 
probably best for courts to refrain from interfering in pure business 
decisions. Failed product lines such as the Ford Edsel or New Coke are 
examples of disastrous business decisions that nonetheless should not 
expose either directors or executives to personal liability. However, the 
business judgment rule is often applied beyond sensible limits to shield from 
scrutiny decisions so flawed that the implication of director bias is difficult to 
ignore.27 
More troubling, however, is the rule’s application in instances where 
the existence of an underlying conflict is beyond dispute. Courts have 
shielded potentially corrupt or opportunistic actions from critical judicial 
supervision by encouraging directors to envelope conflict decisions in a veil 
of protection through the approval of independent directors. The use of 
independent directors to validate actions tainted by conflicts of interest is 
the central feature of procedural mechanisms that create nearly 
insurmountable hurdles for shareholders who seek to challenge board 
actions through derivative litigation.28 
The demand requirement and the special litigation committee device 
both emphasize the legitimizing effect of independent director action to 
facilitate early dismissal of derivative actions before courts consider the 
merits of shareholder claims.29 Under the demand requirement, a 
shareholder cannot sue in the corporation’s name unless she first makes a 
demand on the board or demonstrates that such demand would be futile.30 
 
 26. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (asserting that there is no substantive 
duty of care and that “such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule”). 
 27. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (approving settlement of suit 
regarding a corporation’s decision to build a museum to house its CEO’s art collection because 
the business judgment rule would protect the board’s decision); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 
776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (applying the business judgment rule to a corporation’s refusal to 
install lights at its stadium or schedule night games, even though every other major league team 
had done so); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (dismissing 
a complaint challenging a tax-disadvantaged, in-kind stock dividend despite allegations that the 
dividend benefited the corporation’s executives under its incentive compensation scheme). In 
each of these cases plaintiff’s allegations of bias or ulterior motive were disregarded and the 
business judgment rule invoked to forestall scrutiny of the justifications for the decision. 
 28. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 625, 653–54 (2004). 
 29. See id. at 661. 
 30. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
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To establish demand futility, plaintiffs must allege particularized facts that 
create a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board was disinterested and 
independent or that the challenged decision was a valid exercise of business 
judgment.31 As currently applied, the demand requirement has erected a 
formidable bar for plaintiffs seeking to survive a motion to dismiss. 
Generally speaking, plaintiffs are required virtually to prove the merits of 
their claims without the benefit of discovery.32 
In the rare instances when courts excuse demand, defendants have an 
additional chance to wrest control of the litigation. The board can appoint a 
special committee of “independent” directors to investigate the charges.33 
Even when all of a corporation’s directors are implicated in the alleged 
wrong, they can appoint two or three new directors to the board and assign 
to them the task of evaluating whether a suit against their board colleagues 
should be dismissed.34 Such a committee, after completing its investigation, 
typically moves to dismiss the action over the plaintiff’s objections.35 With 
few exceptions, courts have been receptive to such requests.36 
 
 31. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). Although Aronson posited this two-
part test in the conjunctive, later decisions make clear that a reasonable doubt as to either 
condition is sufficient to excuse demand. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991). 
 32. Without discovery, shareholders must rely on publicly available information or 
unauthorized disclosures by corporate whistleblowers to compile sufficient facts to support their 
allegations. In response to criticism of its demanding pleading standards, Delaware judges have 
urged plaintiffs to use the “tools at hand,” including requests for corporate records authorized 
by statute, to muster the information necessary to survive demand. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 266 (Del. 2000) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974)). Litigating a request for 
inspection of records under section 220 is a cumbersome and time-consuming process when 
compared to the liberal standards provided for discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26, with Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18553, 2002 WL 
31458233 (Del. 2002)(reviewing decision regarding plaintiff’s request for documents under 
section 220). 
 33. The question of who qualifies as an independent director is contentious. In Delaware, 
courts have taken a deferential approach, exhibiting a willingness to overlook many potential 
conflicts and adopting a “domination and control” standard for disqualifying directors. See, e.g., 
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815–16; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 355 (Del. Ch. 
1998). 
 34. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981); CLARK, supra note 24, at 
645. 
 35. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE 
209–11 (9th ed. 2004). The special litigation committee’s authority to procure the dismissal of 
derivative litigation has been recognized in most jurisdictions, although courts afford varying 
degrees of deference to the committee’s recommendation. In New York, courts apply the 
business judgment rule to the determinations of a special litigation committee. See Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that the court may inquire only into the 
disinterested independence of the directors on the committee and the methodologies and 
procedures followed by the committee). Iowa courts afford no deference to a special litigation 
committee appointed by defendant directors. See Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 
336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983) (holding that directors who are parties to derivative action 
may not appoint a special litigation committee but the corporation may apply to the court for 
appointment of “special panel” to investigate and report on the suit). Delaware takes a middle 
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A trio of contractual devices—exculpation, indemnification, and 
insurance—provides a final layer of protection that together insulate 
directors almost completely from monetary exposure in the event of a 
shareholder suit.37 Delaware’s exculpation statute permits corporations to 
adopt charter provisions that eliminate almost all monetary liability for 
breach of duty of care.38 Most large Delaware corporations have adopted 
such a provision.39 
 
ground between complete deference to and complete rejection of special committee findings, 
allowing courts to inquire into both procedural and substantive aspects of the committee’s 
determination and giving courts wide discretion over the final decision. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d 
at 788–89. Zapata established a two-part test for review of motions to dismiss based on a special 
litigation committee’s findings. First, the court should inquire into the committee’s 
independence and good faith and the basis for its conclusions. If satisfied as to this inquiry, the 
court may in its discretion proceed to a second step and apply its own business judgment, taking 
into consideration issues of law, public policy, and the corporation’s best interests to determine 
whether to grant the motion. Id. As applied, however, Zapata resembles the Auerbach standard. 
See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 519 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff’d, 499 A.2d 1185 (Del. 1985) 
(applying the Zapata test). 
 36. See, e.g., Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 519. There have been a few cases where courts have 
denied a committee’s motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1166 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (concluding it was unlikely that committee which had already made public 
statements indicating that it had prejudged the case could prove its independence); In re Oracle 
Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 948 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying motion to terminate action 
because of substantial social ties between the defendants and the committee members); Lewis v. 
Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 965 (Del. Ch. 1985) (noting that the committee consisted of only one 
member who had significant political and financial dealings with the defendant CEO). 
 37. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=382422) [hereinafter Black et al. I]; Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the 
Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
393, 412–14 (2005); E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of 
Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401 (1987). 
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). This provision permits corporations to 
include in their charter: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty 
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit liability of a 
director (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve 
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; 
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal 
benefit.  
Id. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors’ Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295 (1998), 
for a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of section 102(b)(7) and 
similar liability limiting provisions in other states. 
 39. Surveys report that almost all Delaware corporations have adopted exculpatory charter 
provisions. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 
490 (2000) (out of a sample of one hundred small- and mid-capitalization companies, only one 
did not have such a provision); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the 
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160–61 (1990) (in a sample of 180 Delaware firms, over 
ninety percent had a liability limiting provision). 
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In addition, typical indemnification arrangements require corporations 
to cover litigation costs associated with an officer’s or director’s official 
duties.40 Most indemnification provisions require the corporation to fund 
litigation costs in advance, subject to a promise to reimburse the corporation 
in the event of an adverse ruling.41 This commitment to indemnify directors 
is usually backed by director and officer liability insurance paid for by the 
corporation.42 The director and officer liability coverage funds litigation 
costs and pays most settlements of shareholder suits, even settlements of 
claims for which indemnification is prohibited by statute.43 
C. THE “NO LIABILITY” RULE AND THE ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
The cumulative effect of these protective devices is a de facto “no 
liability” rule for corporate directors. Independent directors face an 
infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to the corporation caused 
by their breach of fiduciary duty. They face no real risk of liability for their 
acts or omissions as directors. 
This “no liability” reality has been widely recognized by corporate 
scholars.44 As Professor Lynn Stout has put it, a director is “more likely to be 
attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for the breach 
of the duty of care.”45 Professor Stout’s killer bee analogy is equally 
applicable for duty of loyalty breaches. A recent study by Professors Bernard 
Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner confirmed what most scholars 
have concluded from casual observation.46 That is, “no outside director of a 
public company has paid out-of-pocket for either damages or legal expenses 
under securities law, ever, nor under corporate law since Van Gorkom in 
1985.”47 
 
 40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145; Black et al. I, supra note 37; Veasey et al., supra note 37, at 
404–08 (summarizing Delaware’s indemnification provisions). An adverse ruling against a 
director precludes corporate indemnification. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 35, at 206. 
 41. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1083 (2006) 
[hereinafter Black et al. II]. 
 42. Id. at 1085. 
 43. Veasey et al., supra note 37, at 417–20. Section 145(b) prohibits indemnification of 
settlements in derivative actions, however insurance is typically available to cover such non-
indemnifiable liabilities. Id. 
 44. See Black et al. I, supra note 37, at 5–7; Fairfax, supra note 37, at 414 (observing a 
regime of “nearly complete exoneration” for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care). 
 45. Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives for Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to 
Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2003). 
 46. Black et al. I, supra note 37, at 2 (“[O]utside directors face a tiny risk of actual liability 
for good faith (non-self-interested) conduct, no matter how careless or reckless they are. They 
almost never pay anything to anyone, whether for damages, fines, or legal expenses.”). 
 47. Id. This statement precedes the WorldCom and Enron settlements discussed later in 
this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 287–92. In an updated study, Professor Black and 
his colleagues uncovered ten more instances of out-of-pocket payments by directors (in 
addition to Van Gorkom, Enron, and WorldCom) in the period between 1980 and 2005. See 
JONES_FINAL_REVISED 11/20/2006 4:51:51 PM 
118 92  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2006] 
A central tenet of political and social theory is that legitimate power 
must be accompanied by a system of accountability.48 Accordingly, political 
theorist Dennis Thompson recommends that corporations adhere to a 
democratic concept of responsibility which requires officials to acknowledge 
their agency in making decisions and provide a justification for the 
decision.49 The requirement for accountability rests on the simple notion 
that “people who have power must justify their decisions to those who are 
significantly affected by those decisions.”50 Meaningful accountability allows 
sanctions (positive or negative) to be imposed by those to whom the agent is 
accountable.51 
By diluting the disciplinary power of the derivative lawsuit, courts have 
undermined director accountability. In theory, directors are accountable to 
shareholders through derivative lawsuits, shareholder voting, and the 
invisible hand of the market. In practice, each of these mechanisms fails to 
provide meaningful accountability. 
Corporate statutes provide that shareholders elect directors who 
appoint corporate managers. In reality, however, the direct inverse is true. 
Shareholders of public companies have no practical ability to influence the 
selection of board nominees.52 Instead, managers and incumbent directors 
select board nominees who are “elected” by shareholders who have no 
alternative choices. Thus, year after year incumbent directors renominate 
themselves, virtually ensuring their perpetual reelection. 
Although market forces may provide a measure of discipline by driving 
down stock prices or facilitating hostile takeovers, the market cannot 
provide the type of accountability political theorists demand. Markets 
cannot require directors to explain or justify their decisions. Although 
managers are sometimes motivated to explain their decisions to the 
investment community, generally they are not required to do so. 
Because of the flaws in shareholder voting and market discipline as 
accountability mechanisms, the shareholder lawsuit represents the only 
forum corporate law provides through which directors could be held to 
account for poor decisions or oversight failures.53 Unfortunately, the “no 
 
Black et al. II, supra note 41, at 1063–64. Their tally excludes instances of out-of-pocket 
payments by directors who were also executives of the company sued, or payments made by 
controlling shareholders on their own behalf or on behalf of outside directors. Id. at 1063. 
 48. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS 
AND HEALTHCARE 3 (2005). 
 49. Id. at 5. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 45 
(2003). 
 53. Some commentators argue that reforms to the shareholder voting system could 
enhance executive and director accountability. Id. at 44. 
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liability” rule has stripped the shareholder suit of this potential power.54 The 
business judgment rule, the special litigation committee, and the demand 
requirement all work to spare directors of the need to justify their actions.55 
Although some commentators claim that unsuccessful lawsuits promote 
accountability because such suits represent a nuisance to director 
defendants,56 this argument is suspect. Procedural rules that bar discovery 
and depositions spare directors of the requirement to explain their actions. 
Virtually all cases are dismissed or settled short of trial, further protecting 
directors from public scrutiny.57 Finally, under indemnification 
arrangements, corporations pay all of directors’ legal expenses. Thus, the 
financial and reputational costs posed by shareholder litigation are tightly 
circumscribed. 
III. THE SOCIAL NORMS DEFENSE OF THE “NO LIABILITY” RULE 
Although the existence of a “no liability” rule in corporate law is not 
subject to serious dispute, the rule’s desirability has been hotly contested. 
Although, the effects of the rule seem pernicious, many corporate scholars 
defend the rule.58 The dominant defense of the “no liability” rule is that 
legal enforcement through shareholder litigation is unnecessary because 
market forces adequately discipline directors.59 Scholars point to a number 
 
 54. The failure of the shareholder lawsuit as an accountability mechanism can be seen in 
data collected by Professors Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas. They report that most 
shareholder litigation in Delaware is class action litigation in the acquisition context, and that 
this is the only category of cases in Delaware in which plaintiffs have experienced any significant 
measure of success. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 (2004) [hereinafter 
Thompson & Thomas, New Look]. Their data also suggest that the only effective judicial 
constraint on managerial self-dealing comes in the form of class action litigation in controlling 
shareholder cases. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, Shareholder Litigation: 
Reexamining the Balance Between Litigation Agency Costs and Management Agency Costs 63 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=336162) [hereinafter 
Thompson & Thomas, Litigation Agency Costs] (“[T]he overall pattern of settlements in our 
data [show that] judicial relief is reserved for cases where those who control the company have 
used that control to impose terms that favor themselves over the public shareholders.”). This 
finding is significant because the scenario in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), is 
one area of law where Delaware courts have tempered barriers to the enforcement of fiduciary 
duties. Under Weinberger, the business judgment rule does not apply, even when independent 
directors approved the challenged transaction. Id. at 703. Also as a direct class action, a 
Weinberger case is spared derivative litigation’s crippling procedural hurdles. 
 55. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2005). 
 57. Thompson & Thomas, New Look, supra note 54, at 158. 
 58. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 331 (1976). 
 59. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 95–96 (1991); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the 
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of market forces that they claim act as a constraint against management 
misdeeds. These include product markets, the employment market for 
managers, and, most significantly, the securities markets.60 
According to these theories any corporation with ineffective 
management will fail to thrive in competitive markets. Unless corporations 
develop innovative products or deliver desirable services, they will lose 
market share to better managed companies. Managers of companies that fail 
to compete effectively face risk of replacement by their board, job loss 
precipitated by a corporate bankruptcy, or takeover.61 These competitive 
pressures motivate officers and directors to competently manage their 
companies and refrain from directing corporate assets to personal use.62 
Capital markets are said to add an additional source of discipline for 
poor managers. Capital markets respond to inept or unfair management 
practices by discounting the price investors will pay for a corporation’s 
stock.63 A depressed stock price, some argue, should prompt managers to 
implement business reforms in order to protect their jobs. If management 
fails to respond appropriately, the low stock price will attract hostile bidders 
seeking to acquire a controlling interest in the company. A successful hostile 
bidder can then replace the ineffective management team and make other 
strategic changes that further shareholder interests.64 
As many scholars have noted, there are significant flaws in the market-
based defenses of the “no liability” rule.65 The argument assumes market 
 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262–73 (1977) (arguing that markets for products 
and services and the market for management control regulate management behavior). 
 60. Winter, supra note 59, at 264–66 (asserting that the market for products and services 
constrains corporate behavior because “management which chooses inefficient growth . . . will 
only reduce the share it might have appropriated directly for itself”). 
 61. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 59, at 95 (“Managers also face scrutiny in the 
labor markets. If sacked today, they may have trouble matching their income elsewhere.”). 
 62. Id. at 4–5 (“Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors but they 
find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act is if they had investors interests at 
heart.”). 
 63. Id. at 18–22, 96–99; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1430 (1989) (arguing that maintaining a governance 
structure which “reduces investors’ expected returns will produce a corresponding reduction in 
price”); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–
13 (1965)(“[T]he market for corporate control gives to these shareholders both power and 
protection commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs.”). 
 64. See Winter, supra note 59, at 266 (“Thus, if a firm is mismanaged, robbed, or overly 
attentive to nonprofit goals, the price of its shares will drop and others will perceive an 
opportunity to take over the corporation and install new and more efficient management to 
raise the share price.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1462–70 (1992); Victor Brudney, Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1420–27 (1985) 
(discussing why markets for managers and for securities are ineffective constraints on 
management behavior). 
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participants can detect whether managers are competent or effective. 
Unfortunately, systemic market failures and imperfections undermine any 
legitimate faith in these mechanisms. Furthermore, both critics and 
proponents of market-based regulation agree that the anti-takeover 
mechanisms permitted under state law severely weaken the disciplinary 
power of the takeover threat.66 Most troubling, as WorldCom, Enron, and 
other scandals demonstrate, executives can easily obscure their own 
mismanagement for years by falsifying their corporations’ financial reports, 
preventing markets from appropriately pricing their securities.67 All of these 
market limitations have led to growing doubts about the empirical validity of 
the efficient market hypothesis upon which many of the market-based 
defenses rely.68 
A. THE LAW AND NORMS APPROACH 
An alternative defense of corporate law’s “no liability” rule is that social 
norms motivate directors and officers to govern corporations responsibly. 
Although flaws in the market-based defense of the “no liability” rule have 
been fully explored, the implications of the “social norms” argument have 
not been adequately examined. When subject to scrutiny, the arguments 
proffered in favor of norms governance fail to sustain the claim that the 
disciplinary power of social norms minimizes the need for legal sanctions for 
fiduciary breaches. Social norms have the potential to motivate good 
conduct, but they are also capable of supporting undesirable conduct.69 For 
this reason, the norms-based justifications for the hands-off self-regulatory 
approach to corporate governance must be carefully examined. 
The emergence of the “law and social norms” movement can be traced 
to Robert Ellickson’s book, Order Without Law.70 Professor Ellickson studied 
the dispute resolution practices of landowners in Shasta County, 
 
 66. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. 
U. L. REV. 180, 195–96 (1992) (arguing that anti-takeover mechanisms have led corporate 
practice to diverge from what market-based arguments assume); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 1161, 1169–70 (1981) (arguing that takeover defenses decrease shareholder welfare partly 
because tender offers function as a mechanism for regulating corporate management). 
 67. Fairfax, supra note 37, at 428–32 (citing Enron as an instance of a company’s stock 
price failing to reflect the risk of mismanagement). The analyst fraud that burgeoned during 
the dot-com boom also raises doubts about the effectiveness of market discipline. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 148–52 (2002) (noting the problematic influence that 
investment analysts may have on investors). 
 68. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 175–77 (2d. ed. 2005). See generally 
Symposium, Revisiting the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 499 (2003). 
 69. ELSTER, supra note 1, at 141. 
 70. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
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California.71 Two competing property rules governed who was responsible 
for the damage caused when a rancher’s cattle wandered onto another 
person’s property. In some parts of the county, the “open range” areas, 
cattle owners were not liable for property damage caused by their 
trespassing cattle.72 In “closed range” areas, however, the cattle owner was 
strictly liable for any such damage.73 
Ellickson found that Shasta County ranchers and farmers resolved 
disputes without regard to the formal legal rule that prevailed in their area.74 
Instead, residents were committed to an “overarching norm of cooperation 
among neighbors” and followed an informal rule that cattle owners are 
responsible for the acts of their animals.75 According to Ellickson, Shasta 
County residents rarely appealed to the police or sued each other. Instead, 
they settled disputes by relying on a system of informal enforcement of social 
norms.76 Ellickson’s broad conclusion was that “informal systems of external 
social control are far more important than law in many contexts, especially 
ones where interacting parties have a continuing relationship and little at 
stake.”77 
Ellickson’s case study could simply be taken as evidence of the 
advantages of alternative dispute resolution or of the virtue of maintaining 
good relationships with neighbors. However, many scholars viewed it as 
something more: a basis for questioning the effectiveness of traditional 
regulatory practices. These scholars, inspired by the work of Ellickson and 
 
 71. Id. at 41. 
 72. Id. at 44. An exception to this rule exists if the trespass victim has enclosed her 
property with a “lawful fence.” Id. at 45. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. Id. at 52. 
 75. ELLICKSON, supra note 70, at 53. 
 76. These standards were enforced primarily through self-help measures, including 
negative gossip and threats against the offending owner’s animals. Id. at 79–81. But see Barbara 
Yngvesson, Beastly Neighbors: Continuing Relations in Cattle Country, 102 YALE L.J. 1787, 1793–97 
(1993) (reviewing Order Without Law). Professor Yngvesson disputes Ellickson’s conclusion that 
law plays a minimal role in resolving these property disputes. Id. She cites instances of petitions, 
lobbying and law suits documented by Ellickson which he attributes to outliers who fail to 
conform to the community norms. Id. 
 77. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 
540 (1998) (restating the thesis of Order Without Law). Similarly, Lisa Bernstein asserted law’s 
diminished relevance in dispute resolution among New York’s diamond traders. See Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 
J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992). Bernstein asserted that participants in the diamond industry 
rejected state-created law and replaced it with an elaborate system of internal rules “complete 
with distinctive institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members.” Id. 
Like Ellickson, Bernstein seems captivated by the ability of a private regulatory system free of 
governmental intrusion to maintain social order. However, because, as she describes, the 
diamond club’s arbitration judgments were ultimately enforceable in court, Bernstein’s most 
sweeping conclusions are open to question. Id. at 129. 
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others, christened a new movement in legal scholarship, which they dubbed 
the “New Chicago School.”78 
Members of the New Chicago School have advanced the study of the 
relationship between social norms and individual behavior as a way to 
uncover mechanisms that could allow the government or social groups to 
exploit the power of norms to elicit or reinforce desirable social conduct.79 
They suggest that by harnessing social norms we can reduce our reliance on 
brute state power to maintain social order. Its proponents tend to view the 
government as a benign and nonintrusive “norms manager” that can best 
promote desirable conduct through indirect influence on social norms 
rather than direct legal commands enforced by state-imposed sanctions.80 
Thus, some law and norms scholars urge judges to exploit norms’ 
power by imposing nontraditional shaming penalties on criminal 
offenders.81 Through shaming, a criminal’s wrongful acts are publicized 
through newspaper ads, lawn signs, or bumper stickers.82 This form of 
punishment draws power not from the force of state action, but through the 
shame, embarrassment, and condemnation of peers triggered by the 
shaming sanction.83 Advocates of shaming argue that it can be more effective 
at deterring criminal behavior than traditional sentences like fines or 
imprisonment—all at minimal cost to society.84 
Other scholars argue that law has an expressive function that can be 
used either to reinforce good norms or weaken undesirable norms. For 
example, Lawrence Lessig argues that legal reforms sometimes change the 
“social meaning” of conduct and can thus reduce the popularity of certain 
 
 78. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 661 (1998). A 1997 
article called the “social norms” school “the most provocative new movement in the legal 
academy.” Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Police, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20 & 27, 1997, at 172. Law schools 
throughout the country hosted symposia on law and norms. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics 
and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV 1643 (1996); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1577 (2000); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998). More recently, the Legal Scholarship Network of the Social Science 
Research Network established an electronic journal devoted to the subject. See LSN Research 
Library, Law, Norms and Informal Order (Richard McAdams ed.), http://www.ssrn.com/ 
link/law-norms-informal-order.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 79. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Lessig, supra note 78, at 
661. 
 80. See Lessig, supra note 78, at 661 (“Both the old school and new share an approach to 
regulation that focuses on regulators other than the law. Both, that is, aim to understand 
structures of regulation outside law’s direct effect . . . . The moral of the old school is that the 
state should do less. The hope of the new school is that the state can do more.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996). 
 81. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 
384–85 (1997). 
 82. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631–32 
(1996). 
 83. See id. at 631–42. 
 84. See id. 
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types of socially undesirable behavior.85 He asserts that changes in law have 
changed (or could change) the social meaning of dueling in the antebellum 
south, interracial marriage, cigarette smoking, and the use of seatbelts and 
motorcycle helmets.86 Similarly, Cass Sunstein has argued that the 
government can sometimes act as an effective “norms manager.” He suggests 
that by targeting norms, regulators can reduce risky behavior more cheaply 
and effectively than traditional regulatory methods.87 
B. CORPORATE LAW AND NORMS ANALYSIS 
Enthusiasm soon developed for applying the law and norms approach 
to corporate law analysis.88 Corporate scholars found this line of inquiry 
fruitful for understanding why, in the absence of any real prospect of 
liability, directors seem to care about fulfilling their fiduciary duties.89 For 
example, when considering mergers or tender offers, directors regularly 
consult lawyers and investment bankers to assure themselves that they are 
satisfying the duty of care.90 Some scholars have given credit to social norms 
for motivating proper conduct by corporate officials.91 
Broadly speaking, the corporate law and social norms literature divides 
itself into two camps. One group, represented by Professors Edward Rock 
and Michael Watcher, asserts that directors conform to social norms that 
prevail in the business world to avoid social sanctions such as shaming, 
ostracism, or embarrassment.92 Rock and Wachter view corporations as 
mechanisms for replacing contract-based legal governance with nonlegally 
enforceable governance mechanisms (i.e., norms).93 They argue that 
corporate law “should be understood as protecting and perfecting this 
choice” of nonenforceable obligations and commitments.94 They thus argue 
 
 85. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 947, 956–58, 
963–67 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig II]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2186–87 (1996). 
 86. Lessig II, supra note 85, at 964–68, 990, 1025. 
 87. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 908. 
 88. See generally Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001). 
 89. Stout, supra note 45, at 8–10; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1011–13 (1997). 
 90. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 688 n.50 (2002). 
 91. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 
1269 (1999) (“Although legal standards of conduct are characteristically accompanied by 
liability rules or other enforcement regimes, even a legal standard of conduct that is 
unaccompanied by such a regime may be effective because of its impact on social norms.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2001); Rock, supra note 89, at 
1013; David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1823–36 (2001). 
 93. Rock & Wachter, supra note 92, at 1622. 
 94. Id. 
JONES_FINAL_REVISED 11/20/2006 4:51:51 PM 
LAW, NORMS, AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BOARD 125 
that courts must be careful not to undermine norms governance by unduly 
interfering in internal firm conflicts.95 
The professors’ laissez-faire perspective leads them to support many of 
the doctrines and devices that constitute the “no liability” rule. Accordingly, 
they defend the business judgment rule because it facilitates self-governance 
by “preventing parties from turning to third-party adjudicators,” which 
would undermine the self-governing quality of the relationship.96 Although 
they seem to acknowledge the importance of a legal rule against self-dealing, 
they ultimately argue in favor of rulings that reflect the erosion of the 
prohibition.97 
For example, they praise the cleansing effects of independent director 
approval of self-dealing transactions because allowing such approval 
minimizes the need for judicial interference in corporate decisions.98 They 
argue the duty of loyalty exists to prevent just “enough instances of self-
dealing from slipping through that the overall incentive compatibility of the 
corporate form is not undermined.”99 However, they seem willing to accept a 
certain amount of opportunistic self-dealing as long as it does not vitiate 
shareholders’ and creditors’ willingness to participate in the corporate 
structure.100 In their view, “the law plays the role of sheep dog, but does not 
intervene more than necessary.”101 
Another branch of corporate law and norms literature focuses on the 
importance of directors’ internal motivations. Professors Lynn Stout and 
Margaret Blair argue that norms governance is rooted in two related 
concepts: trust and altruism.102 They first observe that directors of large 
corporations are entrusted with extraordinary power over vast resources and 
the livelihoods of thousands of employees.103 Shareholders, employees, and 
creditors all ultimately depend on directors to execute their duties ably and 
faithfully. They assert that promoting values such as faith and trust should 
help motivate directors to perform responsibly.104 In their view, “case law . . . 
can encourage corporate participants to internalize norms of cooperation 
through social framing—providing information about the social context of 
relationships within the firm.”105 
 
 95. Id. at 1666–67. 
 96. Id. at. 1623. 
 97. Id. at 1661–63. 
 98. Rock & Wachter, supra note 92, at 1662–63. 
 99. Id. at 1661 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 1662. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations 
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1809–10 (2001); Stout, supra note 45, at 8–9. 
 103. Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 1737. 
 104. Id. at 1738–39. 
 105. Id. at 1796. 
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Unlike Rock and Wachter, Professors Blair and Stout argue that market 
discipline and the fear of social sanctions likely provide a “weak constraint 
on opportunism within firms.”106 Rather than relying on incentive 
compensation or liability schemes to elicit optimal behavior, they suggest 
that the law should instead demonstrate that we expect faithful performance 
for its own sake “by articulating a social expectation that directors will 
exercise due care.”107 Although they are not clear on exactly how the law 
should play that role, they suggest that hortatory comments from judges in 
legal opinions will often suffice. They argue, for example, that “[w]hen the 
Delaware chancery court trumpets the importance of careful attention to 
fiduciary duties, directors and officers are likely to heed that call—even 
though they may have little or no external incentive for doing so.”108 
Related to this “trust”-based model of corporate governance, Professor 
Stout also has argued that legal structures should appeal to directors’ sense 
of altruism.109 She points to social dilemma studies that show that people 
consistently engage in cooperative behavior and demonstrate a desire to 
help others.110 These studies suggest that, contrary to the central assumption 
of neoclassical economic theory, people are not inherently rational, selfish 
actors. Professor Stout argues that by appealing to directors’ altruistic 
tendencies, the law can help promote responsible corporate conduct.111 
These norms-based theories of governance provide a theoretical 
defense for corporate law’s “no liability” rule. By promoting self-governance 
through norm enforcement as preferable to a system of judicially imposed 
sanctions, theorists lend support to the existing laissez faire approach to 
corporate regulation. Whether the argument is that norms’ disciplinary 
power operates through shaming or through internalized preferences, both 
approaches support the conclusion that legal sanctions for fiduciary 
breaches are superfluous and might even impair the functioning of a norms 
governance regime. 
Professors Rock and Wachter maintain that judicial interference 
undermines the self-governance mechanisms that are the raison d’etre for the 
corporate form.112 Similarly, Professors Blair and Stout warn against relying 
on sanctions as a deterrent mechanism, asserting that “attempts to provide 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1744. 
 108. Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 1797. 
 109. Stout, supra note 45, at 13. 
 110. Id. at 10–13. 
 111. Id. at 14–15 (suggesting that “directors might be inclined to behave in an other-
regarding fashion simply because a respected authority asks them to do so”); see also Michael B. 
Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to 
Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 815–19 (2003) (advocating the application of 
altruistic theory to resolve the problem of excessive executive compensation). 
 112. Rock & Wachter, supra note 92, at 1622. 
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external motivation for cooperative behavior can instead reduce 
cooperation by undermining corporate participants’ internal motivations.”113 
Furthermore, they argue that an increased volume of fiduciary duty 
litigation will alert well-intentioned directors to others’ shirking, and may 
thereby encourage them to adopt a less diligent posture toward their 
fiduciary obligations.114 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE LAW AND NORMS APPROACH 
The social norms arguments outlined above have considerable intuitive 
appeal. For most of us most of the time, the law remains in the background 
and is not the guiding force in our day-to-day behavior. Instead, much of our 
decision-making is automatic and reflexive, and is influenced by factors of 
which we may not be aware. Not only is this common sense, but this account 
of ordinary decision-making has been documented by psychologists.115 
However, psychological theory fails to support many claims of norm 
theorists. Most importantly, psychological theory does not support the claim 
that norms, without support from law, can adequately regulate behavior. 
This Part introduces criticisms of general law and norms scholarship 
before providing a more specific critique of the prescriptive claims of 
corporate law and norms scholars. The general critique of law and norms 
focuses on the absence of a coherent methodology. The specific critique of 
corporate law and norms focuses on the absence of empirical support for its 
prescriptions. 
A. GENERAL LAW AND NORMS THEORIES 
Scholars have criticized the law and norms school on a number of 
fronts. First, critics complain that the literature has largely ignored the 
wealth of knowledge on norm development available in the social science 
literature.116 Critics also charge that the law and norms literature lacks 
intellectual rigor found in the social sciences and has “fail[ed] to deliver on 
its promise of a new kind of interpretive method.”117 On the whole, critics 
conclude that the law and norms school has done little to enhance our 
 
 113. Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 1809. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded 
Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 698–99 (2003). 
 116. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 648–49 (1997); Mark Tushnet, “Everything Old Is New Again”: Early 
Reflections on the “New Chicago School,” 1998 WIS. L. REV. 579, 585–86 (1998); Robert Weisberg, 
Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
467, 474 (2003). 
 117. Weisberg, supra note 116, at 469. According to Professor Weisberg, the norms school 
offers “little distinct theory other than a few general concepts like conformity and esteem-
seeking and a sense of fairness, and some borrowings from behavioral cognitive theory and 
game theory.” Id. at 470. 
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understanding of how law affects behavior and, more importantly, how legal 
reform can encourage desirable conduct.118 
One problem with the law and norms approach is a frequent 
underlying assumption that rules that evolve through social norms are 
superior to legal rules, simply because they originate through decentralized 
processes. These organic origins suggest to some that social norms reflect 
social groups’ preferences and interests better than centrally imposed 
rules.119 In addition, many law and norms proponents strain to fit a theory of 
norm development within law and economics’ rational choice framework.120 
They seek to modify rational choice theory to take account of norms, instead 
of adopting a more instructive analytical perspective.121 In doing so, they fail 
to account adequately for the strands of social science literature that 
question the value of rational choice theory as a basis for understanding law 
compliance. 
Despite many norms theorists’ faithfulness to a rational choice 
approach, important psychological research rejects the theory as a mode for 
understanding law compliance.122 Research by scholars such as Tom Tyler, 
John Darley, and Paul Robinson shows that, contrary to the tenets of rational 
choice theory, people do not focus on personal gains or losses in deciding 
whether to obey the law.123 Rather, people consider “the relationship 
 
 118. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1603, 1607 (2000) (“[W]hen it comes to using this more textured understanding of human 
experience to improve our ability to predict the effects of legal rules, the verdict is far less 
clear.”); Tushnet, supra note 116, at 582. Professor Tushnet asserts, “there are reasons to think 
that there are better ways to study norms than to force them into a mold derived from a law and 
economics approach, or at least that there are literatures other than law and economics with 
which a dialogue on the level of theory would be productive.” Id. 
 119. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 70, at 167–68. Jon Elster persuasively challenges this 
claim. ELSTER, supra note 1, at 147–48 (“Some norms do not make everybody better off: they 
make everybody worse off or they shift the balance of benefits to favour some people at the 
expense of others.”). 
 120. See generally POSNER, supra note 79; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997). 
 121. Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 605, 615 (2004) (observing that the rational choice model has “provided the basic 
platform from which explanation of norm origin and development has proceeded”); Tushnet, 
supra note 116, at 579; Weisberg, supra note 116, at 467–78. Weisberg notes: 
In its analytic mode, this school often seeks to redeem microeconomic approaches 
to law from excessive abstraction, to draw on corrections to rigid rational choice 
theory supplied by experimental psychology, to enrich rational choice theory with 
the deep strategic logic of game theory and, occasionally, in its focus on the 
phenomenon of “social meaning,” to pay some fealty to cultural anthropology or 
the Humanities. 
Weisberg, supra note 116, at 467–68 (footnotes omitted). 
 122. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 21–24 (1990) (contrasting the instrumental 
approach to law compliance with the normative approach). 
 123. Id. at 24. 
JONES_FINAL_REVISED 11/20/2006 4:51:51 PM 
LAW, NORMS, AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BOARD 129 
between various kinds of potential behavior and their assessments of what 
behavior is appropriate.”124 These researchers identify individual moral 
values as the most important determinants of law-abiding behavior.125 Their 
research links the sense of obligation to obey the law with individual and 
group perceptions of the legitimacy of the law and its enforcement 
mechanisms and practices.126 
This research on law compliance raises doubts regarding claims that 
raising the cost of an activity by invoking social sanctions can significantly 
alter the degree of law-abiding behavior.127 Instead, such research suggests a 
more complex relationship between law, norms, and conduct than many law 
and norms scholars seem willing to embrace.128 The studies emphasize the 
importance of individual moral values, which are influenced by both the 
substance of law and perceptions of its fairness, in terms of rules, 
procedures, and punishments.129 Some implications of these findings for 
corporate law reform are further discussed in Part V.130 
B. CORPORATE LAW AND NORMS THEORIES 
Corporate law and norms theorists often argue that the absence of any 
real prospect of personal liability for the breach of fiduciary duty is 
unobjectionable because social norms appropriately constrain the conduct 
of corporate officials. They maintain that even though courts rarely find 
liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, by stating important principles or 
criticizing errant directors and executives, judicial opinions provide 
meaningful guidance to directors which motivates them to behave 
responsibly. 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 64–66 (“The most important normative influence on compliance with the law is 
the person’s assessment that the law accords with his or her sense of right and wrong . . . .”). 
 126. See id. at 57 (“Those who regard legal authorities as having greater legitimacy are more 
likely to obey the law in their everyday lives.”); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 949, 982 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Deterrence] (reporting that people obey the 
law because they feel “a moral imperative to ‘do as the law says you should do’”). 
 127. See TYLER, supra note 122, at 44 (concluding that “[p]eer disapproval . . . seems an 
unlikely source of pressure to obey the law”). 
 128. See Massaro, supra note 116, at 692 (arguing that shaming proponents “underestimate 
the complexities of manipulating shame and influencing shame norms”); Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. L. REV. 453, 473 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & 
Darley, Desert] (“[P]assing a law cannot itself create a norm, and not passing a law against 
certain conduct cannot make that conduct morally acceptable to the community.”). 
 129. See TYLER, supra note 122, at 172 (concluding that people “focus most strongly on 
questions of procedural justice” when people evaluate legal authorities based on their personal 
experiences); Robinson & Darley, Desert, supra note 128, at 477 (arguing that the criminal law’s 
ability to influence social norms is “directly proportional to criminal law’s moral credibility”); cf. 
Massaro, supra note 116, at 697 (arguing that reliance on shaming functions may undermine 
general perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system). 
 130. See infra text accompanying notes 224–97. 
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Although corporate law and norms theorists are correct to emphasize 
the importance of directors’ internal motivations and values in ensuring 
responsible job performance, they place undue faith in the ability social 
norms to motivate directors to act appropriately.131 Because social norms are 
fluid and vary from group to group, we cannot rely on them to prevent 
corporate misconduct. Even when social norms do lead people to behave 
appropriately, such happy occurrences shed little light on the proper 
response to those who fail to comply both with the law and corresponding 
social norms. 
1. Theoretical Flaws 
The norms governance view oversimplifies the complex relationship 
between law and social norms. In reality, the law both reflects and shapes 
norms. Law, the vigor with which it is enforced, and the severity of sanctions 
for its violations all influence our understanding of what our moral 
obligations are.132 Because the law helps to shape norms, norms cannot be 
expected to compensate for a failure to enforce the law. This dynamic 
relationship between law and norms means that courts’ systematic failure to 
enforce directors’ legal obligations is cause for serious concern. A lax 
enforcement approach implies to directors, shareholders, and society 
generally that the fiduciary duties of officers and directors are less morally 
important than duties or obligations that are more vigorously enforced.133 
Despite the troubling moral implications of the “no liability” rule, 
corporate law and norms theorists argue that judges are helping to shape 
desirable social norms among directors despite their unwillingness to 
seriously probe director conduct.134 They argue that judges, through their 
legal opinions, telegraph to directors what society expects of them.135 These 
judicial opinions are presumed to carry moral force that helps discourage 
fiduciary breaches even when courts ultimately decline to impose liability.136 
 
 131. Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 1796–99. 
 132. See generally TYLER, supra note 122. 
 133. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 114 (2006) (arguing that the failure to enforce legal rules promotes disrespect for 
the law). 
 134. Rock, supra note 89, at 1016–17. 
 135. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 1744; Rock & Wachter, supra note 92, at 1694–
97; Stout, supra note 45, at 15 (suggesting that judicial opinions can encourage directors to 
fulfill their duties not by threatening them with the prospect of liability but “by expressing and 
reinforcing social norms of careful and loyal fiduciary behavior”). 
 136. See Rock, supra note 89, at 1039; Skeel, supra note 92, at 1854–57 (“Even if she does not 
impose monetary liability, for instance, a judge can shame an offending director by explicitly 
criticizing her in the published opinion for the case.”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 
1797 (“When the Delaware chancery court trumpets the importance of careful attention to 
fiduciary duties, directors and officers are likely to heed that call—even though they may have 
little or no external incentive for doing so.”). 
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Corporate law and norms theorists unjustifiably diminish the role 
liability plays in conveying an effective message to directors. When courts 
assert that conduct is morally questionable, yet legally permissible, they 
convey a mixed message that enables directors to conclude reasonably that 
the conduct in question was not that bad. The “no liability” rule thus 
undermines the positive role judges could play in encouraging the 
development of desirable social norms among directors. 
The derivative litigation surrounding former Walt Disney Company 
President Michael Ovitz’s lavish severance package demonstrates the 
dubious nature of the claim that weak judicial exhortations positively 
influence board norms.137 In a series of decisions, Delaware courts 
repeatedly condemned the Disney board’s conduct, but ultimately declined 
to impose liability for its lapses in handling the hiring and firing of Disney 
executive Michael Ovitz. The courts stated in various opinions that although 
the Board’s conduct fell short of ideal corporate governance standards, 
because Delaware corporate law requires far less, no breach of duty 
occurred.138 
The trial court’s 2005 decision regarding the conduct of Disney CEO 
Michael Eisner is illustrative of this problem. With regard to Eisner’s 
conduct in hiring Ovitz and determining his compensation package, the 
chancellor found: 
Eisner’s actions in connection with Ovitz’s hiring should not serve 
as a model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow. His lapses 
were many. He failed to keep the board as informed as he should 
have. He stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by 
acting without specific board direction or involvement. He 
prematurely issued a press release that placed significant pressure 
on the board to accept Ovitz and approve his compensation 
package in accordance with the press release. To my mind these 
actions fall far short of what shareholders expect and demand from 
those entrusted with a fiduciary position. Eisner’s failure to better 
involve the board in the process of Ovitz’s hiring, usurping the role 
 
 137. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL 1562466 
(Del. June 8, 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 1875804 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 
(Del. Ch. 1998). For a more complete summary of facts and issues in the litigation, see Jones, 
supra note 28, at 651–53. 
 138. Walt Disney, 2005 WL 1875804, at *1–2 (stating that “there are many aspects of 
defendants’ conduct that fell significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate 
governance” but concluding that “the director defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties 
or commit waste”). 
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for himself, although not in violation of law, does not comport with 
how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act.139 
Despite asserting that Eisner’s conduct fell “far short of what 
shareholders expect and demand” from a fiduciary, that his actions did not 
comport with “how fiduciaries of Delaware corporation are expected to act,” 
and even that Eisner had “enthroned himself as the omnipotent and 
infallible monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom,”140 the chancellor 
concluded that “Eisner acted in good faith and did not breach his fiduciary 
duty of care because he was not grossly negligent.”141 
One less familiar with Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence might expect 
that conduct falling “far short” of how fiduciaries are expected to act would 
ipso facto constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Similarly, one might conclude 
that a senior officer who acts without board authorization on an important, 
and ultimately ill-advised, corporate decision would not be found to have 
acted in good faith.142 Indeed, the Disney decision makes one wonder why 
the law requires corporations to have directors and imposes duties on them 
if the board’s authority can be usurped so readily with no adverse 
consequences for either the usurper or the supine directors.143 
To many, the result in the Disney litigation is evidence of the emptiness 
of corporate law. Still others speculate that, as a community, directors are 
chagrined when their peers’ conduct is publicly condemned in this 
manner.144 They argue that such opinions will spur other directors to attend 
more vigorously to their duties.145 This conclusion, although plausible, is 
highly questionable. It is more likely that directors will conclude that if the 
Disney board’s conduct satisfies fiduciary standards then anything goes, and 
minimal efforts at simulating informed discussions will continue to protect 
directors from liability.146 
 
 139. Id. at *41 (footnote omitted). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Nowicki, supra note 23, at 20. 
 143. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 8 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 159, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=801308. 
 144. Macey, supra note 56, at 1134 (arguing that directors “do not like to be made the 
object of public scorn and ridicule”). 
 145. Martha Neil, Disney Case Has No Storybook Ending, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 6, 2005, 
available at Westlaw, 4 No. 35 ABAJEREP 5 (quoting corporate commentators who speculate 
that the Disney decision will spur directors to be more attentive). Chancellor Chandler seems to 
expect as much as he states “that the Opinion may serve as guidance for future officers and 
directors—not only of The Walt Disney Company, but of other Delaware corporations.” In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 
2005). 
 146. See Recent Case, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 923, 
927–28 (2006).  
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2. Empirical Weaknesses 
In addition to the logical flaws in the case for norms governance, 
empirical data show that norms governance does not work as well as its 
advocates claim. Widespread agreement exists that directors should follow 
the best practice principles set forth by the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
and other prominent commentators.147 Yet, despite corporate leaders’ 
professed acceptance of the ALI’s monitoring model, studies show that 
director behavior typically falls far short of these ideals. 
a. The Ideal 
Perhaps because little specific judicial guidance is available about how 
directors should fulfill their fiduciary obligations, most corporations and 
their directors aspire to follow best practice standards recommended by 
various independent organizations. These standards serve as an informal 
guide to directors in structuring their operation as a body. The ALI’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance (“ALI Principles”) are the most widely 
recognized statement of best practice standards. 148 
The ALI Principles embraces a monitoring model of board governance 
under which the board’s main role is to oversee management’s 
performance.149 In this role, directors oversee the corporation’s strategic 
direction, evaluate management performance, and, when necessary, take 
steps to replace management.150 The board also serves as a sounding board, 
 
 147. Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 1279; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of 
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 
GEO. L.J. 797, 797–98 (2001) [hereinafter Langevoort, Human Nature] (observing the success of 
efforts to promote the monitoring model). 
 148. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (outlining 
recommended procedures for corporate governance). 
 149. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 
237–40 (1997). For critiques of the monitoring model as currently implemented, see Mitchell, 
supra note 143, at 2 (arguing that the monitoring model has “become an institution of 
corporate governance that is essentially a fraud, designed not to govern but to protect directors 
from liability”) and Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 658–59 (1982) (questioning the ability of independent directors to fulfill 
the monitoring model’s mandate). 
 150. The ALI recommends the following tasks for a well-functioning board: 
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where appropriate, 
replace the principal senior executives. 
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation’s business to evaluate whether the 
business is being properly managed. 
(3) Review and, where appropriate, approve the corporation’s financial objectives 
and major corporate plans and actions. 
JONES_FINAL_REVISED 11/20/2006 4:51:51 PM 
134 92  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2006] 
reviewing management decisions and providing a check on overreaching.151 
This monitoring model has been endorsed by trade groups and other 
organizations concerned with corporate governance, such as the National 
Association of Corporate Directors, the Business Roundtable, and the 
Council of Institutional Investors. Each of these organizations has adopted 
its own corporate governance standards which essentially mirror the ALI’s 
recommendations.152 
b. The Reality 
To perform the tasks set out in the monitoring model, directors must 
be engaged, skeptical, well-informed, independent, objective, and highly-
motivated.153 Unfortunately, the reality of board performance departs 
dramatically from this ideal. Seminal studies of directors suggest that even in 
the best of circumstances, directors rarely perform the tasks essential to the 
monitoring model’s success.154 Recent reports from independent 
investigations into the WorldCom and Enron debacles also raise serious 
doubts about directors’ willingness and ability to police corporate executives 
as the monitoring model requires. 
i. The Classic Studies 
In the 1970s, Harvard Business School Professor Myles Mace 
interviewed hundreds of directors and executives of large and medium-sized 
public corporations.155 Mace concluded that directors were generally passive 
 
(4) Review and, where appropriate, approve major changes in, and 
determinations of other major questions of choice respecting, the 
appropriate auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used in 
the preparation of the corporation’s financial statements. 
(5) Perform such other functions as prescribed by law, or assigned to the board 
under a standard of the corporation. 
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, § 3.02(a). For directors to perform their monitoring duties, the 
ALI Principles maintains that a board should be comprised of at least a majority of independent 
directors who lack a “significant relationship with the corporation’s senior executives.” Id. § 
3A.01(a). Only directors who are free from corrupting ties with management can credibly 
evaluate the performance of the corporation’s senior executive officers. Id. § 3A.01 cmts. c–d. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See generally THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Nov. 
2005) (on file with Iowa Law Review); COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE POLICIES (Apr. 2006) (on file with Iowa Law Review); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS, GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES (on file with Iowa Law Review). 
 153. See, e.g., PAUL P. BROUNTAS, BOARDROOM EXCELLENCE 49–54 (2004) (describing the 
necessary traits for an effective director); Langevoort, Human Nature, supra note 147, at 797–98. 
 154. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 41 (1971); see also JAY W. LORSCH & 
ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 6 
(1989). 
 155. MACE, supra note 154, at 3. 
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and deferential to the president, springing to action only in times of crisis.156 
Although Mace found that boards serve several useful functions,157 the 
method of their selection, their close affiliations with management, and the 
limitations on their time all assured that, for the most part, their presence 
within the corporate structure was merely ceremonial.158 
In 1989, Harvard Business School Professor Jay Lorsch and Elizabeth 
MacIver conducted another comprehensive study of corporate boards.159 
While their conclusions were more positive than Mace’s, they nonetheless 
confirmed a continuing gap between ideal board performance and reality.160 
The authors found that a number of undesirable norms prevail in the 
boardroom. For example, they observed that directors were expected “above 
all, to treat the CEO with respect” and, thus, avoid embarrassing him in 
board meetings.161 Eschewing open criticism, directors tended to couch 
their objections to management proposals in the form of “penetrating” 
questions.162 Outside directors also refrained from contacting each other 
between board meetings, which they viewed as “dealing behind the 
chairman’s back.”163 The result of these suppressive norms was that board 
meetings that purported to be frank and open discussions, in actuality, were 
often merely “a charade of productive, problem-solving discussions.”164 
Lorsch and MacIver also confirmed Mace’s findings that because most 
directors are busy people with demanding full-time jobs, they devote 
relatively little time to their board duties.165 These time constraints, coupled 
with directors’ insurmountable informational disadvantages, vis-à-vis the 
CEO, meant that they deferred almost slavishly to the CEO’s wishes, except 
in times of crisis.166 
 
 156. Id. at 27–39, 41. 
 157. In particular, Mace found that directors serve as a valuable sounding board for 
executives, allowing them to test out new ideas and business proposals. Directors also provided 
a valuable disciplining role. Regular board meetings prompted executives to prepare detailed 
reports, to explain financial results, and to justify their business decisions and proposals. Id. at 
10–27. 
 158. Id. at 107–10. 
 159. LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 154, at ix–x. 
 160. Id. at 1–4. 
 161. Id. at 93. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (quoting from a director interview). This practice and some others described by 
Mace and Lorsch and MacIver have been superseded by intervening governance reforms 
including those required by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the self-regulatory organizations 
(“SROs”) listing standards. For example, SRO rules require directors to meet in executive 
session outside the presence of the CEO, a practice that directors whom Lorsch and MacIver 
interviewed described as a sign of disloyalty. 
 164. LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 154, at 94–95. 
 165. Id. at 24–25. 
 166. Id. at 170–71. 
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ii. Recent Evidence 
The Mace and Lorsch and MacIver studies are clearly dated.167 Much 
has changed in the corporate governance landscape since these studies were 
conducted. Lorsch’s current view is that corporate boards are more active 
than at the time of his study.168 In support, he cites the current focus on 
director independence and best practice standards and the increased 
incidence of boards firing underperforming CEOs.169 
Although Professor Lorsch’s optimism is heartening, the independent 
investigations that followed the WorldCom and Enron scandals reveal that 
the pattern of board conduct reported by Mace and Lorsch and MacIver has 
continued at many U.S. companies.170 An unprecedented scale of fraud was 
revealed at Enron and WorldCom, two of the country’s most respected 
corporations, in late 2001 and 2002. Whether measured in terms of the 
magnitude of investor losses, the number of jobs eliminated, the size of the 
bankruptcy filing, or the sheer audacity of the perpetrators, these scandals 
surpassed all that had come before.171 
 
 167. See supra note 163. 
 168. Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, The Professionalization of Corporate Directors, in JAY W. 
LORSCH ET AL., RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 71, 72 (2005). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Lorsch and Lipton acknowledge the significance of counterexamples such as Enron 
and thus conclude the further board reform is necessary. Id. at 72–73. 
 171. Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, following the restatement of five years 
of operating results, the opening of an SEC probe, and the plummeting of its stock price due to 
investor concerns about its dealings with outside partnerships run by CFO Andrew Fastow. At 
the time, Enron’s bankruptcy was the largest in U.S. history (its bankruptcy is now second only 
to WorldCom). Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, 2001, at A3. For authoritative accounts of Enron’s accounting shenanigans, see generally 
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002) and 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy Rapaport & Bala Dharan eds., 
2004). Former Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lay and former CEO Jeffrey Skilling were 
convicted on charges arising from their roles in the scandals. Mr. Lay died of a heart attack on 
July 5, 2006. Because he died before his conviction was finally appealed, his conviction will likely 
be vacated. See Ashby Jones & John R. Emshwiller, Quirk of U.S. Law Exonerates Lay, Possibly 
Hindering Asset Seizure, WALL ST. J., Jul. 7, 2006, at C23; Greg Farrell, Disposition of Ken Lay’s 
Wealth in Limbo with Conviction Likely to Be Vacated, Are Funds Forfeited?, USA TODAY, Jul. 7, 2006, 
at 2B. 
  WorldCom filed for bankruptcy on July 21, 2002. With $107 billion of assets and $41 
billion of debt, its bankruptcy remains the largest in U.S. history. Simon Romero & Riva D. 
Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest US Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1; Simon 
Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WordCom’s Collapse: The Overview; Extra Level of Scrutiny in WorldCom’s 
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A1. The bankruptcy filing followed the company’s 
disclosure that it had improperly accounted for $3.8 billion in expenses. Investigators found 
that WorldCom’s executives had improperly failed to deduct $4 billion in expenses from its 
income statement. In 2004, WorldCom restated its results for 2000 and 2001, reducing its 
pretax income for the period by $74 billion. Gretchen Morgenson, 10 Ex-Directors from WorldCom 
to Pay Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A1. 
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In addition to WorldCom and Enron, contemporaneous scandals 
revealed similar failures to detect fraud in other major companies. For 
example, telecom companies Global Crossing and Qwest Communications 
also collapsed in accounting scandals. Among other accounting tricks, Qwest 
and Global Crossing engaged in sham capacity swaps, which both companies 
used to artificially inflate their revenue.172 The breadth of accounting 
misconduct in American corporations extended beyond these headline 
cases. Between 1997 and 2002, ten percent of all listed companies restated 
their financial results at least once.173 The number of SEC enforcement 
actions for accounting fraud also increased dramatically during this period, 
further suggesting that such improper accounting practices were 
widespread.174 
To many, these scandals indicated deep flaws in the governance 
structure of American corporations. In response to such concerns, the 
corporations and courts appointed respected legal experts to investigate 
what went wrong. The court handling WorldCom’s landmark bankruptcy 
proceeding appointed former SEC chairman Richard Breeden as 
“Corporate Monitor” of WorldCom.175 Mr. Breeden prepared a report 
analyzing the weaknesses in the company’s governance structure that 
contributed to its unprecedented fraud.176 Mr. Breeden concluded that even 
though WorldCom’s board satisfied the formalistic requirements of the ALI 
Principles, they failed to adhere to the most important principle—providing 
effective oversight.177 He found that WorldCom’s directors “consistently 
ceded power over the direction of the Company to [CEO Bernard] 
 
 172. Other prominent companies involved in accounting irregularities during the late 
1990s included AOL-Time Warner, Rite Aid, and Xerox. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 
937 (2003). 
 173. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 35, at 182; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral 
Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928482. 
 174. See generally MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (1987–1997). 
The SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) series provides a 
comprehensive source of alleged cases of financial fraud in the US. Id. at 11. The AAERs are 
numbered sequentially beginning with No. 1 in 1982, reaching No. 651 in 1995, and growing 
dramatically to No. 2200 by mid-2005. Selected AAERs are available at 
www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml. 
 175. See RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF: THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. 13 (2003) [hereinafter RESTORING TRUST], available 
at http://www.thedirectorscollege.com/images/downloads/Breeden%20 Report%20Restoring 
%20Trust.pdf. For an additional account of the governance failures at WorldCom see FIRST 
INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY COURT EXAMINER (2002); SECOND 
INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY COURT EXAMINER (2003). 
 176. RESTORING TRUST, supra note 175, at 14–15. 
 177. Id. at 25–34 
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Ebbers,”178 who “was allowed nearly imperial reign over the affairs of the 
Company, without the board of directors exercising any apparent restraints 
on his actions . . . .”179 
Most emblematic of the board’s failures was its acquiescence to $400 
million in corporate loans from WorldCom to Ebbers.180 These loans, which 
Ebbers never repaid, were arranged by two of his close associates on the 
board and blindly ratified by the full board.181 The board also failed to 
detect the massive financial fraud that WorldCom’s executives 
perpetrated.182 They did not apprise themselves of fatal weaknesses in 
WorldCom’s financial controls or the many ethical lapses of Ebbers and 
other senior executives who orchestrated the company’s massive accounting 
fraud.183 
Enron’s board of directors appointed a Special Committee chaired by 
William Powers, Dean of the University of Texas Law School, to investigate 
the circumstances leading to Enron’s collapse. The Special Committee 
reached conclusions similar to the WorldCom report regarding the 
dysfunctional qualities of the Enron Board.184 Like WorldCom’s board, 
Enron’s directors failed to familiarize themselves with details of the 
company’s financial statements, unwisely acceded to management requests 
for departures from the code of conduct, and failed to ask tough questions 
of management necessary in light of the numerous conflicts of interests 
permitted by the board.185 
For example, the board repeatedly approved waivers of Enron’s Code of 
Conduct to allow the company to enter into transactions with entities 
controlled by CFO Andrew Fastow and other senior executives. These 
partnerships ultimately served as vehicles for the company’s massive 
accounting fraud and facilitated at least $30 million in illicit payments to 
Fastow.186 In addition to its reckless waivers of Enron’s Code of Conduct, the 
board failed to institute or follow adequate procedures to monitor the 
approved transactions.187 These oversight failures played a significant role in 
furthering the fraudulent schemes of Enron’s management team.188 
 
 178. Id. at 1. 
 179. Id. at 1–2, 25. 
 180. Id. at 28. 
 181. RESTORING TRUST, supra note 175, at 28. 
 182. Id. at 31–32. 
 183. Id. at 31–35, 45. 
 184. See SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION 3–5 (2002). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 22–24. 
 187. Id. at 10. 
 188. See id. 
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What distinguishes Enron and WorldCom from many other public 
companies is not the passivity and insouciant nature of their boards, but the 
extent of corruption of the corporations’ top executives and the 
extraordinary duration and scope of the fraud they were able to 
perpetrate.189 
C. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Insights from psychologists on basic motivations in human behavior also 
cast doubt on the soundness of the central prescriptive claims of corporate 
law and norms theorists. Because of basic human tendencies including 
conformity, consistency, and self-justification, any self-contained system of 
norms-based governance is bound to deteriorate over time and allow 
increasingly unethical conduct to occur. 
A standard argument in defense of norms governance can be termed 
the “competence argument”—the assertion that because directors are 
successful, motivated individuals with hard-earned reputations for integrity, 
they are eminently capable of policing themselves and their peers.190 A 
wealth of psychological research suggests that the opposite is true. Norms 
governance fails because without an external corrective mechanism, 
acceptable norms drift and become replaced with undesirable norms. As 
unethical conduct becomes commonplace, it becomes more widely 
tolerated. Such unraveling of ethical standards is destined to continue 
absent credible external checks on misconduct.191 
Certain aspects of board culture such as passivity and deference to the 
CEO allow chronic corporate governance problems to fester.192 These 
problems, which include excessive executive compensation, accounting 
fraud, and earnings management, suggest that a self-governance system is 
incapable of resolving the most intractable problems in corporate law.193 
1. Conformity 
The first psychological phenomenon that undermines directors’ ability 
to exercise independent oversight is the tendency toward conformity. The 
extent to which people are willing to suspend their individual judgments in 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 172–74. 
 190. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 894 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (listing 
defendants’ professional qualifications and experience and arguing “[d]irectors of this caliber 
are not ordinarily taken in by a ‘fast shuffle’”). 
 191. See John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational 
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1189–91 (2005). 
 192. See supra notes 147–89 and accompanying text. 
 193. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1–12 (2004) (examining how corporate 
governance structures fail in the area of executive compensation); ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON 
THE STREET 149–74 (2002) (describing prevalent earnings management tactics). 
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order to conform to a group consensus was firmly established by Solomon 
Asch.194 In these famous experiments, individuals were asked to judge the 
relative length of lines. The correct answer was both simple and obvious, yet 
when research confederates first gave an incorrect answer research subjects 
agreed thirty-seven percent of the time.195 Asch’s findings show that social 
influence can often overwhelm a person’s confidence in his own judgment 
even when the issue is neither ambiguous nor complex. The tendency to 
conform can easily lead smart, competent people astray, causing them to 
substitute the erroneous judgments of others for their own rational 
evaluations. 
Conformity tendencies are even stronger when one is subject to the 
influence of an attractive or appealing group. This phenomenon, known as 
“identification,” causes people to adopt values and attitudes, not in order to 
obtain a reward or avoid a punishment, but just to “be like” the admired 
person or group.196 Theorists assert that social identity helps people foster a 
sense of belonging and strengthens their sense of place within society.197 A 
person typically adopts a number of social identities that serve as a guide to 
behavior. Theorists speculate that the influence of “social identity” affects 
the development of group norms.198 These self-selected social identities lead 
to conformity to a group prototype, a stereotypical version of the group 
member.199 
This group identity concept helps explain board conduct. As corporate 
scholars have long observed, “[t]he process by which board members are 
selected, the criteria by which their candidacy and continued service are 
evaluated, and the motives and rewards that compel nominees and directors 
to serve on the board all interact to form a highly cohesive group of 
mutually attractive individuals.”200 Some scholars argue that the pull of 
 
 194. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, SCI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31. Stanley 
Milgram’s well-known obedience studies in which unwitting subjects administered what they 
believed to be painful and potentially deadly shocks to other research participants also 
demonstrate our sometimes pathological propensity for conformity. See generally Stanley 
Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963). 
 195. Asch, supra note 194, at 31–35. In the fifty years since Asch’s study, the same results 
have been obtained consistently in replications of the experiment. ELLIOT ARONSON, THE 
SOCIAL ANIMAL 17 (9th ed. 2004). 
 196. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 29. 
 197. John C. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of the 
Group, 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 77, 94–95, 115 (1985). 
 198. Geisinger, supra note 121, at 632. 
 199. Id. at 638; Michael A. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity 
Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 255, 260 (1995). 
 200. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and 
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 98. 
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group cohesion is partly to blame for the directors’ oversight failures in the 
Enron scandal.201 
Directors of large public corporations are members of a surprisingly 
homogeneous group. They overwhelmingly share common social, 
economic, racial, and religious backgrounds.202 These common 
characteristics help cement a culture that emphasizes shared goals and 
values and discourages open dissent. Problems highlighted in studies of 
boards—an unwillingness to ask discerning questions, a desire to conceal 
ignorance, and the perceived obligation to support the CEO—can be 
explained in part by the tendency to conform and the desire to fit in. 
A legal regime can counteract the tendency toward conformity by 
providing an accountability mechanism that emphasizes accuracy as an 
objective. Psychological studies confirm the view of social theorists that 
accountability—a requirement to explain one’s decision to others—can 
weaken the otherwise strong pressure to conform to peer judgments.203 As 
succinctly put by one psychologist, “people will go along in order to get 
along unless they know that they will be held accountable for a dumb, 
compliant decision.”204 
Board studies also support the view that increased accountability can 
improve corporate decisionmaking. Executives acknowledge that their 
perfunctory accountability to the board strengthens their decision-making 
practices.205 Knowing that they will have to account to the board for their 
decisions compels executives to examine the costs and benefits of their 
proposals and develop a coherent rationale for a proposed course of 
action.206 If directors knew they might be required to account to courts for 
their decisions or oversight failures, they should be similarly motivated to act 
with more independence and objectivity.207 
 
 201. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1233, 1238–39 (2003) (arguing that ingroup bias contributed to the Enron board’s failure to 
detect and prevent the company’s massive fraud). 
 202. See KORN FERRY INT’L, 26TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 11 (1999) (reporting 
that 6% of all publicly held Fortune-listed company directors are ethnic minorities and 10% are 
women); LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 154, at 18 (reporting that 93.8% of Fortune 1000 
directors are white males, two-thirds are over fifty-five years old and 63% are CEOs of other 
corporations); Cox & Munsinger, supra note 200, at 106; Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on 
Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 795, 799–803 (reviewing current data on board diversity). 
 203. Andrew Quinn & Barry R. Schlenker, Can Accountability Produce Independence? Goals as 
Determinants of the Impact of Accountability on Conformity, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
472, 480 (2002). 
 204. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 21. 
 205. MACE, supra note 154, at 23–27. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See infra notes 224–33 and accompanying text. 
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2. Consistency 
Directors’ ability to police themselves and the executives they monitor is 
also affected by the desire to act consistently with prior commitments. That 
is, “once we make a choice or take a stand, we will encounter personal and 
interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment.”208 
The desire for consistency leads to the psychological discomfort that 
psychologists label cognitive dissonance, which occurs when a person 
simultaneously holds two inconsistent cognitions or beliefs.209 People seek to 
reduce dissonance by changing one or another cognition, by avoiding 
dissonant information, or by seeking out additional consonant 
information.210 The effects of cognitive dissonance often detract from the 
ability to process important information rationally. 
Under widely accepted best practice principles, “independent” directors 
should be detached, disinterested, and armed with a healthy skepticism 
toward executives and their fellow directors. Such lofty expectations are 
unlikely to be realized when one considers the power of bonds of friendship 
and collegiality that are emphasized in board culture. This culture of 
collegiality, coupled with the psychological desire for consistency, means 
that so-called “independent” directors are unlikely to exhibit the very 
qualities of independence and objectivity that are essential for the 
monitoring model’s success. 
To illustrate, imagine a director, Smith, who holds the following 
“cognitions” or beliefs about his fellow director, Jones. Jones is a nice guy 
who went to an Ivy League college and business school, just like Smith. Jones 
is the CEO of a successful multi-national company, belongs to his local 
church, and plays a leadership role in his community. All of these factors 
cause Smith to think of Jones as a likable and highly respected person. As 
such, Smith is likely to resist any allegations that Jones is trying to line his 
pockets through an unfair sweetheart deal with the corporation. 
Faced with the prospective psychological discomfort of holding 
inconsistent cognitions, Smith, if asked to approve a transaction between 
Jones and the corporation, is likely to deflect information that suggests the 
deal is unfair. Dissonance theory predicts he will not actively seek out 
negative information about the deal. He will likely minimize the importance 
or reliability of any negative information he encounters. Finally, he may seek 
out additional information to support the deal that counteracts the impact 
of any negative information he receives. Given such biases, Smith can hardly 
be expected to serve as an impartial arbiter of the transaction between Jones 
 
 208. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 53 (4th ed. 2001). 
 209. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962). 
 210. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 154–56. 
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and the corporation.211 This tendency calls into question the effectiveness of 
disinterested director approval in protecting corporations and their 
shareholders from executive overreaching. 
If independent directors knew that courts would have the final word on 
the appropriateness of the insider deals they approve, they might consider 
the facts more objectively, as they would expect the courts to do. 
Unfortunately, the basic tenets of corporate law provide assurance that such 
decisions will not be independently reviewed. The absence of director 
accountability in these transactions accommodates the propensity to 
interpret information in a way that satisfies the desire for consistency. 
3. Self-Justification 
In addition, the desire to justify one’s actions can decrease a director’s 
willingness to acknowledge or remedy actions in violation of fiduciary duties. 
The urge to justify one’s actions becomes more acute when the act in 
question reflects poorly on one’s own moral character. This is because the 
effects of dissonance are strongest when the self-concept is threatened.212 
Because most people like to think of themselves as moral and decent, one’s 
knowledge that one has committed an immoral act creates dissonance with 
this otherwise positive self-concept.213 A common mechanism for reducing 
dissonance related to the self-concept is self-serving rationalization of the 
immoral behavior.214 
Psychological studies confirm this tendency toward self-justification. In a 
classic study, sixth-grade children were tempted to cheat in a contest under 
conditions in which they believed their cheating would not be detected.215 
Those children who succumbed to temptation and cheated in the contest 
later expressed more lenient attitudes toward cheating than they held before 
the experiment.216 In contrast, children who were similarly tempted to cheat 
but resisted later adopted a more stringent attitude toward cheating than 
they had previously expressed.217 
The tendency to rationalize immoral behavior to protect the self-
concept is observable throughout the general population.218 However, it is 
likely that directors’ propensity toward self-justification is even stronger than 
 
 211. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 193, at 33–34 (describing how dissonance affects 
executive compensation decisions); see also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 200, at 84–85. 
 212. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 169. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 170. 
 215. Judson Mills, Changes in Moral Attitudes Following Temptation, 26 J. PERSONALITY 517, 
520–23 (1958). 
 216. Id. at 531. 
 217. Id. 
 218. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 160–61. 
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that of an ordinary person who occupies a lower social status.219 Dissonance 
effects are greatest when people feel personally responsible for their actions 
and their actions have serious consequences, which is typically the case with 
board decisions that often affect the well-being of shareholders, employees, 
and the economy as a whole. 
Studies also show that people with high self-esteem, a quality typical of 
directors, experience higher levels of dissonance when implicated in 
immoral actions than those with low self-esteem.220 This is because their 
involvement in misconduct stands starkly at odds with their otherwise 
positive self-concept.221 Although high self-esteem can serve as a buffer 
against immoral behavior, when people with high self-esteem succumb to 
the temptation to self-deal or fail to prevent gross misconduct, they are more 
likely than the average person to experience the type of attitude change that 
leads to norm erosion. 222 
The various psychological phenomena discussed in this section create a 
danger that the standards by which directors assess their own conduct and 
that of the executives they monitor will unravel in a cycle of continuous 
decline.223 Without the prospect of external intervention, directors will tend 
to disregard and, if necessary, rationalize executive misconduct up to the 
point that they confront incontrovertible evidence of wrongdoing or 
impending financial disaster. The problem is not that most directors are 
inherently corrupt, lazy, or immoral. Rather, these unconscious influences 
will affect even the most intelligent and well-intentioned individuals. Thus, 
the institutional structure in which directors operate must provide some 
rigidity to compensate for the flexibility and fluidity of moral judgments. 
 
 219. Id. at 170. 
 220. Id. at 186; see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-
Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 974 
(2002). Professor Langevoort also notes that those with high self-esteem are slow to recognize 
problems attributable to their own actions. Id. 
 221. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 186–87. Professor Aronson’s views on the role of the self 
in cognitive dissonance have been challenged by other social psychologists. See Jeff Stone & Joel 
Cooper, A Self-Standards Model of Cognitive Dissonance, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 228, 
229–30 (2001) (summarizing competing theories on the role of the self in dissonance). 
 222. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 186–88. 
 223. See Darley, supra note 191, at 1186. Darley argues that when an action that many 
people think is wrong goes uncriticized, it becomes acceptable as moral due to what he calls a 
“pluralistic ignorance” of other observers’ disapproval. Id.; see also Maria Merritt et al., Moral 
Disintegration: Character and the Vagaries of Reason (Jan. 25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with Iowa Law Review). 
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V. REFORMING THE DIRECTOR LIABILITY SCHEME 
A. THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
Social psychologists have found that requiring accountability can 
counteract the distorting impact of conformity and consistency.224 As shown 
here, markets, norms, and shareholder voting all fall short as mechanisms 
for accountability. Social norms do influence behavior, but without an 
accountability mechanism such norms are susceptible to erosion that 
undercuts their usefulness as a system of social control. 
If judges were willing to impose penalties for fiduciary breaches, 
shareholder litigation could help promote accountability for corporate 
wrongdoing. In theory, such litigation could serve to influence positively the 
development of corporate norms and thus improve director conduct. Such 
litigation would raise the salience of directors’ ethical obligations, 
reminding directors and the public of the importance of fiduciary duties, 
and the harm suffered when directors violate these duties.225 In addition, 
public scrutiny of director conduct may create dissonance for directors that 
could lead to self-correcting actions. Studies show that dissonance created by 
confronting people with evidence of their own hypocrisy (such as a prior 
failure to meet one’s own conduct standards) can lead to sustained 
behavioral change.226 
An enforcement strategy that promotes accountability through 
litigation-generated scrutiny has led to meaningful reforms in the financial 
services industry. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer led a series of 
high-profile investigations of widespread abuses in the brokerage, mutual 
fund, and insurance industries.227 The public exposure of the endemic 
conflicts in these industries compromised executives’ ability to continue 
rationalizing the unethical practices. Faced with irrefutable evidence of 
illegal conflicts and fraud, business leaders agreed to fundamental reforms 
 
 224. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
 225. Robinson & Darley, Desert, supra note 128, at 472 (“Every time criminal liability is 
imposed it reminds us of the norm prohibiting the offender’s conduct and confirms its 
condemnable nature.”). 
 226. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 193–95; see also Elliot Aronson, The Return of the Repressed: 
Dissonance Theory Makes a Comeback, 3 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 303, 307–08 (1992); Carrie B. Fried, 
Hypocrisy and Identification with Transgressions: A Case of Undetected Dissonance, 20 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 145, 145–46 (1998) (describing hypocrisy paradigm); Blake M. McKimmie et al., 
I’m a Hypocrite but So Is Everyone Else: Group Support and the Reduction of Cognitive Dissonance, 7 
GROUP DYNAMICS 214, 221 (2003) (stating that social support from a salient in-group can 
reduce the dissonance impact of hypocrisy); Jeff Stone et al., Inducing Hypocrisy as a Means of 
Encouraging Young Adults to Use Condoms, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 116, 118–21 
(1994) (reporting that subjects in “hypocrisy” condition were more likely to purchase condoms 
after making an AIDS-prevention presentation). 
 227. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities 
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 117–21 (2004). 
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and renounced conduct that had been widely accepted and practiced within 
their industries.228 Mr. Spitzer relied in part on the glare of publicity to 
pressure corporate leaders to account for their management and oversight 
failures. The sanctions he exacted included significant penalties, leadership 
changes at the highest levels, and preventative structural reforms.229 
Some corporate scholars are skeptical about the ability of accountability 
to improve director decisionmaking. For example, Professor Donald 
Langevoort argues that accountability may have the perverse effect of 
strengthening biases that result from the desire for consistency.230 Professor 
Langevoort is correct to point out that accountability for its own sake is not a 
cure-all. We must be careful to specify to whom and for what goals directors 
are accountable.231 However, accountability can be effective in improving 
decisions when the stated goal is accuracy, rather than a social goal such as 
pleasing the person or group to whom one will be accountable.232 A review 
of psychological research on accountability concludes that independent 
decisionmaking is most likely to occur when decisionmakers know before 
forming an opinion that “they will be accountable to an audience (a) whose 
views are unknown; (b) who is interested in accuracy; (c) who is interested 
in processes rather than specific outcomes; (d) who is reasonably well-
informed; and (e) who has a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reasons 
behind participants’ judgments.”233 
 
 228. Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $100 million to settle charges related to Mr. Spitzer’s 
investigations of conflicts of interest at the firm. Id. at 118. The company also agreed to reform 
its stock research practices. Id. A broader investigation led by Mr. Spitzer, the SEC, and several 
other states resulted in a $1.4 billion global settlement by ten Wall Street firms and their 
agreement to reform research practices. Id. at 119. In response to allegations of market timing 
and late trades by mutual fund investors, Putnam Investments fired its CEO and replaced him 
with a reformer who pledged to clean up the company. Id. at 120–21. Putnam ultimately settled 
charges brought by Massachusetts and the SEC, agreeing to pay $110 million in fines and 
restitution. Id. More recently, insurance giant AIG reached a $1.6 billion settlement with the 
SEC and the New York Attorney General in connection with its involvement in insurance bid-
rigging and accounting fraud. Ian McDonald & Kara Scannell, AIG Agrees to $1.6 Billion 
Settlement—Big Insurer Is Set to Pay SEC, State of New York to Resolve Accounting Case, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 9, 2006, at C8. 
 229. Eliot Spitzer, Op-Ed., Strong Law Enforcement Is Good for the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 
2005, at A18. 
 230. See Langevoort, Human Nature, supra note 147, at 826–27. 
 231. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259 (1999); John Pennington & Barry R. Schlenker, Accountability for 
Consequential Decisions: Justifying Ethical Judgments to Audiences, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1067, 1074 (1999) (reporting that the audience to whom participants had to justify their 
decision had a significant impact on their judgments and justifications). 
 232. Serena Chen et al., Getting at the Truth or Getting Along: Accuracy- Versus Impression-
Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262, 272–74 
(1996). 
 233. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 231, at 259. Director accountability to courts, like those 
in Delaware that specialize in corporate law adjudication, should satisfy the criteria for the type 
of accountability that mitigates conformity effects. Id. 
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B. THE CHALLENGE OF DETERRENCE 
The task of revitalizing shareholder litigation to enhance director 
accountability is neither simple nor straightforward. The cure is not simply 
to replace a lax regime with a harsh one. Psychological research suggests 
that harsh penalty schemes will not solve the problem of properly motivating 
directors any better than the legal abdication promoted by law and norms 
scholars. Instead, such research suggests that the current measure of 
damages for fiduciary breaches may be as counterproductive as the “no 
liability” rule from the standpoint of providing director accountability. 
Widespread voluntary compliance with law is essential to maintaining 
social order. To elicit a high degree of voluntary compliance, a legal regime 
must combine appropriate substantive standards that reflect social values 
with appropriate sanctions to act as a constraint on deviators.234 As one 
example, our income tax regime relies primarily on self-reporting by 
taxpayers. These self-reporting obligations are supported by a monitoring 
system and a penalty regime for those who fail to fulfill their obligations. 
Despite these mechanisms, the actual risk of being detected for cheating on 
taxes remains low. Thus, the fear of being caught cannot explain why people 
pay taxes.235 Instead, theorists speculate that people pay taxes because they 
believe they should and because they believe their fellow citizens are also 
doing their part.236 If either of these beliefs were seriously undermined, 
compliance rates would likely falter. 
Classic deterrence theory holds that to deter an activity the perceived 
net cost of the activity must exceed the perceived net benefit.237 Under this 
model, the best way to discourage fiduciary breaches is to increase penalties 
or the likelihood of detection. However, recent scholarship on law 
compliance challenges the presumption that increasing the severity of 
penalties can enhance law’s deterrent capacity.238 
 
 234. Robinson & Darley, Deterrence, supra note 126, at 982 (“A legal code that is perceived as 
having moral credibility can provide a clear set of guidelines around which childhood and 
adolescent socialization can coalesce.”). 
 235. TYLER, supra note 122, at 22. 
 236. Id.; Kahan, supra note 82, at 354; see also ELSTER, supra note 1, at 212–14 (describing 
such thinking as “everyday Kantianism”). 
 237. This is the classic utilitarian approach first advanced by Jeremy Bentham. See generally 
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Wilfrid 
Harrison ed., 1960). The modern formulation is credited to Gary Becker. See Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–77 (1968); see also 
Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 674–76 (2002) (applying the deterrence 
model to assess the likely impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley reforms). 
 238. Robinson & Darley, Deterrence, supra note 126, at 982. Most scholars who question the 
deterrent capability of law focus on criminal law. These scholars acknowledge that their 
arguments may not apply squarely to corporate law or other white collar crimes. For one thing, 
the target group for corporate regulation is limited to a few thousand public company directors 
and executives. Furthermore, deviant personalities are not prevalent in corporate management 
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Harsh penalties for violations of law can actually undermine rates of law 
compliance.239 Harsh penalty schemes can create two types of problems. 
First, courts may be unwilling to impose the legal sanctions called for under 
existing law. Second, harsh penalty schemes may undermine the 
internalization of proper moral values.240 
1. The Nullification Effect of Harsh Liability Rules 
One reason that corporate law fails to effectively deter nonfeasance may 
be the enormous scope of potential liability for directors, which detracts 
from the legitimacy of the corporate liability scheme. A fiduciary breach, if 
proven, subjects each director to liability for the full amount of damages 
suffered by the corporation as a result of the negligent (or grossly negligent) 
decision.241 The measure of damages is not directly related to an individual 
director’s degree of culpability or the benefit received by the director. 
Instead, legal penalties are determined by the amount of economic harm 
that results from the flawed decision.242 For a multibillion dollar company, a 
single mistake could mean millions of dollars of damages to be borne by the 
directors. 
Even for a director who erred in approving a transaction or who 
disregarded evidence of misconduct, such a result seems unfair. A director 
who lacked intent to harm the corporation or was unaware of the potential 
consequences of a failure to act is not the most blameworthy agent for the 
corporation’s losses. The most culpable wrongdoer is more likely to be an 
executive or controlling shareholder seeking personal gain at the 
shareholders’ expense. This disconnect between the degree of culpability 
and the level of penalties called for under corporate law violates basic 
intuitions of desert.243 The departure from the community’s standards of 
 
to the same extent as among street criminals. Finally, because directors and executives generally 
are both wealthy and well-educated, they can be expected to understand their legal obligations 
and have access to expert advice as to whether their conduct violates law and the prospective 
consequences for such violations. Id. at 954; see also Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, 
and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA L. REV. 1295, 1311–16 (2001) (examining the 
rationales for the divergent policy approaches to the treatment of corporate wrongdoing and 
ordinary street crime). 
 239. Robinson & Darley, Deterrence, supra note 126, at 984–87. 
 240. See Blair & Stout, supra note 102, at 1809 (“[A]ttempts to provide external motivations 
for cooperative behavior can instead reduce cooperation by undermining corporate 
participants’ internal motivations.”). 
 241. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Robinson & Darley, Desert, supra note 128, at 490 (“There seems a strong consensus . . . 
that the degree of an offender’s liability should follow to a considerable degree the person’s 
level of culpability toward the conduct constituting the offense.”). 
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fairness can undermine the legitimacy of the regulatory system and weaken 
the perceived obligation to comply with law.244 
The famous Smith v. Van Gorkom245 case demonstrates the perceived 
disproportionality of punishment for violations of the duty of care. In Van 
Gorkom, the court ruled that directors had breached their duty of care by 
approving a merger in a grossly uninformed manner.246 After making this 
determination, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to 
determine damages, which were to be calculated as the difference between 
the $55 per share paid to shareholders and the “fair value” of the shares at 
the time of the merger.247 If the lower court had determined that the fair 
price had been $65 per share, for example, the ten directors, none of whom 
had received a direct benefit from the transaction, would have faced an 
aggregate of more than $130 million in damages.248 The case eventually 
settled for $22 million, most of which was paid by insurance and affiliates of 
the acquiring company.249 
The disproportionate (and arguably undeserved) penalties that can be 
imposed for breach of fiduciary duty create a risk of nullification that has 
been realized in corporate law. As scholars have noted, “courts have proven 
remarkably reluctant to impose liability where no element of self-dealing or 
personal benefit was present.”250 If penalties are perceived as unduly harsh, 
judges and legislators may devise ways to avoid imposing liability and high 
damage awards.251 On this score, the states’ legislative response to Van 
Gorkom is instructive. Shortly after the decision, Delaware’s legislature added 
Section 102(b)(7) to the state’s corporation code.252 This provision permits 
 
 244. Id. at 493. The authors point to “three strikes” laws as an example of disproportionate 
punishment that “undercuts the law’s moral credibility.” Id. 
 245. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 246. Id. at 893. 
 247. Id. 
 248. CHARLES R. T. O'KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 258 (4th ed. 2003). Because of joint and several liability, the company’s wealthiest 
directors might have been required to pay more than their pro rata share of the damages, as any 
portion of the damages left unpaid due to any directors’ insolvency would be apportioned to 
the remaining solvent directors. 
 249. Id. 
 250. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An 
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 317 (1981). 
 251. Id. at 309 (observing that “[t]he paucity of cases imposing liability on corporate 
officials for violations of the duty of due care suggests the existence of . . . a phenomenon” of 
judicial nullification); Donald E. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 664 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Capping Damages] (“I sense that some of 
the excessive judicial hostility to securities class actions that we have seen in recent years may be 
driven by [the] emotion: that protecting those who commit fraud may be preferable to 
subjecting them (and innocent investors) to draconian liability.”). 
 252. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). All 50 states have amended their statutes to 
permit limitations on director liability. 
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corporations to eliminate directors’ monetary liability for most duty of care 
violations. Although judicial nullification is not justifiable, social scientists 
assert it is predictable. Ironically, although judicial nullification is a response 
to the perceived illegitimacy of the law, it further erodes the law’s legitimacy 
by promoting and popularizing disrespect for the law.253 
2. The Need for Internalization of Values 
Threats of severe sanctions also create external justifications and 
motivations for compliance that may interfere with corporate leaders’ 
internalization of ethical values. The law should encourage officials to 
uphold their fiduciary duties because they believe they ought to, not merely 
because they hope to avoid liability. Yet the task of inducing voluntary 
compliance with the law proves more complicated than classical deterrence 
formula suggests.254 
Psychologists’ attitude change studies demonstrate that persuading a 
person to commit a counterattitudinal act—an act inconsistent with one’s 
prior attitudes or beliefs—creates dissonance that can cause the person to 
revise the relevant attitude or belief. However, counter to the logic of 
deterrence theory, the larger the reward offered to induce a 
counterattitudinal act, the smaller the measured amount of attitude 
change.255 Psychologists theorize that when a strong external justification 
(such as a large reward) is provided for a counterattitudinal act, less 
dissonance occurs and therefore attitude change is minimal. Similarly, mild 
threats have been found to be more effective than severe threats in inducing 
lasting behavioral change. 
In studies conducted in the 1960s, researchers sought to discourage 
children from playing with a certain attractive toy. Some children received a 
mild admonishment while others received a sterner warning. When the 
researcher left the room, all of the children obeyed his instructions. At a 
later date, the same children were given the opportunity to play with the 
forbidden toy and were not explicitly prohibited from doing so. The 
children who previously received the mild threat avoided the toy, while 
children in the severe threat condition sought it out.256 Based on these 
findings, psychologists warn that relying on harsh threats and large rewards 
as disciplinary methods can interfere with internalization of moral values.257 
 
 253. See FRANKEL, supra note 133, at 114. 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 230–31. 
 255. Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 208 (1959). 
 256. Jonathan L. Freedman, Long-Term Behavioral Effects of Cognitive Dissonance, 1 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 145, 148–51 (1965); see also Elliot Aronson & J. Merrill Carlsmith, 
Effect of the Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of Forbidden Behavior, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 584, 585–86 (1963). 
 257. CIALDINI, supra note 208, at 82–83; ARONSON, supra note 195, at 171–75. 
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When an external justification becomes the salient rationale for good 
behavior, the desired behavior may occur only in the presence of an 
authority figure.258 
This research suggests that moderate penalties for director negligence 
may better motivate them to serve effectively than would harsh sanctions. 
Consider that directors (most of whom are quite wealthy) get relatively little 
pay for their time. Standard economic analysis would suggest that, given the 
value of their time, the significant opportunity costs imposed, and the low 
marginal utility of director compensation, few directors would be willing to 
serve in the role.259 The stark absence of an adequate material justification 
for board service has led directors to develop an array of internal 
justifications for accepting board positions. Directors report that the most 
significant motivations for board service are intangible rewards: intellectual 
stimulation and exposure to new ideas.260 Directors also report that their 
least important motivation is financial remuneration in the form of 
directors’ fees or equity.261 
If nominal compensation is sufficient to entice directors to join boards 
and develop their own internalized motivations for continued service, an 
enforcement system backed by mild threats could motivate directors to serve 
responsibly and capably.262 The advantages of mild sanctions over draconian 
penalties are two-fold: (1) the mild threat is more likely to be imposed; and 
(2) it may be more effective at inducing voluntary compliance.263 The 
challenge for policymakers lies in calibrating penalties such that they are 
sufficient to elicit compliance (there must be some identifiable consequence 
of misconduct), but not so severe that the threat itself constitutes an 
independent justification for complying with fiduciary obligations. 
This is a complicated calculus because what constitutes “sufficient” 
motivation for a particular act varies from person to person.264 For many 
directors, the mild rebuke of another director may provide sufficient 
motivation for their own appropriate conduct. For many others, however, a 
more serious threat may be necessary to persuade them to take their 
fiduciary obligations seriously.265 
 
 258. See Freedman, supra note 256, at 154 (discussing tendency of children in experiment 
to follow instructions when experimenter is present). 
 259. Professor Stout makes a similar point. See Stout, supra note 45, at 4. 
 260. LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 154, at 28. 
 261. Id. at 29. 
 262. CIALDINI, supra note 208, at 84–87 (describing the phenomenon as “growing legs to 
stand on”). Professor Aronson calls this the justification of effort. ARONSON, supra note 195, at 
175–78. 
 263. Robinson & Darley, Desert, supra note 128, at 477–78. 
 264. CIALDINI, supra note 208, at 84. 
 265. Id. Professor Cialdini illustrates this dilemma with the example of a parent teaching a 
child the value of honesty: 
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C. CALIBRATING DIRECTOR LIABILITY TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY 
This section proposes a net-worth-based penalty scheme for directorial 
negligence that will enhance the disciplinary power of corporate law. It 
argues that the 2005 WorldCom Shareholder Litigation Settlement provides 
a sensible model for calibrating sanctions for negligent director conduct. In 
that settlement, WorldCom’s independent directors agreed to contribute a 
percentage of their personal assets toward the settlement of securities fraud 
claims brought by WorldCom investors.266 
The proposal maintains that negligent directors should pay personally 
when they breach their fiduciary duties. However, such payments should be 
calibrated so that each director suffers a financial setback, but no director is 
financially devastated. A requirement for out-of-pocket payments restores a 
degree of personal accountability that currently is absent from most 
settlements of shareholder lawsuits.267 In addition to furthering the goal of 
personal accountability, such calibrated sanctions would better reflect 
directors’ degree of culpability than the current theoretical measure of 
damages. 
Reducing the scope of director liability is justified only if: (1) liability 
awards become more common, thus raising the standard of conduct 
mandated by courts; and (2) payments of some significance are made by 
directors and executives in disposition of meritorious claims. The ultimate 
goal of such reform is to motivate directors to invest the time and demand 
the information and resources necessary to effectively monitor managers to 
prevent or redress corporate misconduct.268 
1. Prior Proposals 
Other scholars have proposed capping damage awards in shareholder 
lawsuits brought under corporate and securities laws. In 1985, Professors 
 
A strong clear threat . . . might well be effective when the parents are present or 
when the girl thinks she can be discovered. However, it will not achieve the larger 
goal of convincing her that she does not want to lie because she thinks it is wrong. 
To do that a much subtler approach is required. A reason must be given that is 
strong enough to get her to be truthful most of the time but is not so strong that 
she sees it as the obvious reason for her truthfulness. 
Id. 
 266. See infra note 289. 
 267. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1487, 1498–99 n.41 (1996) (noting that only .04 percent of settlement amounts in class 
action securities claims were paid by individual defendants) (citing FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & 
VINITA M. JUNESA, RECENT TRENDS II: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS 
ACTIONS? 9 (Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. 1993)). 
 268. See THOMPSON, supra note 48, at 256 (calling for reforms aimed at creating structures 
“in which normal, ordinarily conscientious people will understand their main responsibility to 
be watching for problems and warning the appropriate officials about them”). 
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John Coffee and Donald Schwartz proposed limiting damages available for 
the breach of duty of care.269 A variation of their proposal was included in 
draft versions of the ALI Principles, which recommended capping damage 
awards against individual defendants for “non-intentional” breaches of the 
duty of care.270 Two alternative limits were proposed. Tentative Draft No. 1 
proposed a dollar limit of $200,000 per individual defendant. Council Draft 
No. 5 adopted a contract-based approach that would have required 
defendants to disgorge any compensation received from the corporation 
during the year the violation occurred.271 
The final ALI Principles endorse the concept of permitting charter-based 
limits on director liability.272 In the meantime, most states amended their 
statutes to authorize the reduction or elimination of liability for certain 
fiduciary breaches. Most of these provisions went far beyond what the ALI 
Principles recommend in that they eliminate rather than merely cap directors’ 
liability.273 When combined with expanded indemnification rights, these 
provisions mitigate instead of enhance director accountability, and thus 
conflict with the spirit of the ALI Principles. 
More recently, scholars have proposed capping damages in open-
market securities fraud cases. Janet Cooper Alexander recommends 
replacing the private cause of action for 10b-5 violations with a regulatory 
remedy.274 She envisions a civil fine scaled according to the level of 
culpability that the violator would pay to the federal treasury.275 She likens 
such a remedy to penalties payable in private civil litigation under the 
federal environmental laws.276 To preserve incentives for private 
enforcement of the securities laws’ anti-fraud provisions, private plaintiffs 
 
 269. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 250, at 317 (suggesting penalties keyed to the financial 
circumstances of the defendant). To address the problem of judicial nullification, Professors 
Coffee and Schwartz proposed that damages in cases exclusively involving the breach of duty of 
care be capped at the greater of an individual defendant’s highest annual gross income during 
the preceding five years or the aggregate director’s fees received by such defendant. Id. at 335. 
 270. Virginia has adopted a liability cap that approximates the ALI proposal included in 
Tentative Draft No. 1. Damages for “non-willful” breaches of duty of care are limited to the 
greater of $100,000 or the cash compensation received during the year preceding the breach. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-692.1 (2001). A cap on damages was also included in the ALI’s proposed 
Federal Securities Code. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708(c)(2) 
(1980); see also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 250, at 318. 
 271. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between 
Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 823 (1984). But see generally James D. Cox, 
Searching for the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI 
Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959; Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute 
Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983) (objecting to the ALI proposals). 
 272. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, § 7.19. 
 273. DeMott, supra note 38, at 297. 
 274. Alexander, supra note 267, at 1508–13 (proposing a privately enforceable regulatory 
remedy for 10b-5 violations). 
 275. Id. at 1509. 
 276. Id. at 1509–10. 
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and their attorneys would receive bounty payments and legal fees.277 
Professor Langevoort has advanced a similar proposal to cap damages 
available in fraud on the market claims.278 Professor Langevoort 
recommends a model based upon the civil penalty provisions of the 
Securities Enforcement Remedies Act and Penny Stock Reform of 1990.279 
He envisions a penalty system graded according to a violator’s level of 
culpability and the degree of harm the violator causes.280 For companies, he 
recommends that penalties be pegged to a percentage of a readily 
measurable figure such as market capitalization, net assets or gross income, 
and setting penalties for executives at a multiple of the executive’s annual 
compensation or his pecuniary benefit from the fraud.281 
Existing exoneration provisions and proposed liability caps fail to 
appropriately balance the goals of providing accountability and avoiding 
undue retribution. One problem with the prior proposals is that any dollar 
amount proposed as a damages cap is necessarily arbitrary and may be 
insufficient to induce the desired behavior.282 In addition, any absolute cap 
will require adjustment over time to account not only for general inflation 
but also for inflation in compensation to executives and directors.283 More 
challenging from a policy standpoint is that the significance of the damage 
award for any individual defendant will vary depending on the defendant’s 
financial situation.284 Finally, common insurance and indemnification 
practices detract from corporate law’s deterrent capacity.285 The ready 
availability of third-party resources to cover costs associated with shareholder 
lawsuits means that directors are rarely held to account personally for 
oversight failures.286 
 
 277. Id. at 1519–20. 
 278. Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 251, at 641–43. 
 279. Id. at 659 (discussing Securities Enforcement Remedies Act and Penny Stock Reform 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2000))). 
 280. Id. at 659–60. 
 281. Id. at 660–62. Professor Langevoort recommends and absolute cap of $10 million in 
penalties for corporations. 
 282. Coffee, supra note 271, at 822. 
 283. See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 251, at 658. 
 284. Consider, for example, Virginia’s director liability cap equal to the greater of $100,000 
or one year’s compensation. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-692.1 (2001). These amounts may be 
insignificant to an outside director who as the CEO of another corporation earns tens of 
millions of dollars per year. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 193, at 1 (reporting average real 
pay of CEOs in 2000 as $14.7 million per year). Disgorgement of directors fees may also be a 
weak deterrent because directors report that their director compensation is not an important 
motivation for board service. See supra text accompanying note 261; LORSCH & MACIVER, supra 
note 154, at 28–29. 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 37–43. 
 286. See Alexander, supra note 267, at 1512 (recommending that certain sanctions for 
securities fraud be uninsurable). 
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2. The WorldCom Model 
The recent settlement reached in In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities 
Litagation287 addresses many of these concerns and thus serves as a promising 
model for reforming adjudication and settlement practices in derivative 
litigation. Although the settlement was procured in a securities fraud action, 
the alleged director misconduct was of the sort that would constitute a duty 
of care violation.288 As part of the settlement, twelve former independent 
directors of WorldCom agreed to contribute $24.75 million in personal 
assets toward a $60.75 million settlement fund for the benefit of defrauded 
WorldCom investors.289 Each director agreed to pay out–of–pocket twenty 
percent of his or her net worth (excluding primary residences and 
retirement funds) toward the settlement.290 The settlement represents one 
of the few times in modern history that outside directors have had to pay 
personally to settle charges made in connection with their failure to 
discharge their oversight duties. 
Shortly after the WorldCom settlement was announced, ten former 
Enron directors agreed to personally pay $13 million toward a $168 million 
settlement of a securities fraud claim.291 Unlike the WorldCom settlement, 
for which the directors’ contribution was calculated based on net worth, the 
Enron directors’ contribution was based on ten percent of their pre-tax 
profits from sales of Enron stock.292 
The personal payments agreed to in the WorldCom and Enron 
settlements are significant, yet not severe enough to create the impression of 
unjust punishment that has undermined the legitimacy of existing director 
liability schemes. Many can agree that directors should not face financial 
ruin for mistakes in judgment from which they did not benefit. Yet, courts 
should not completely relieve directors of responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions or inaction. The WorldCom settlement deftly 
 
 287. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 288. Thompson & Sale, supra note 3, at 903–05. 
 289. The settlement followed more than twenty months of negotiations and was finally 
approved on September 21, 2005, by Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York. 
WorldCom, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 319. The lead plaintiff in the case was the New York State 
Common Retirement Fund and after the settlement was announced, New York State 
Comptroller Alan Hevesi stated that he “‘felt personally that this would be unfair and not a 
deterrent for future failures on the part of directors if they weren’t held personally liable.’” The 
Director’s Cut, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A12; see also Joan S. Lublin et al., Directors Are Getting 
the Jitters—Recent Settlement Tapping Executives’ Personal Assets Put Boardrooms on Edge, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 13, 2005, at B1; Gretchen Morgenson, 10 Ex-Directors from WorldCom to Pay Millions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 290. WorldCom, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 325. 
 291. Rebecca Smith & Jonathan Weil, Ex-Enron Directors Reach Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 
2005, at C3. 
 292. Id. 
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navigates between these two extremes because, by design, each defendant 
can afford to pay the penalty. 
3. Likely Objections 
One objection to a requirement that directors’ personal assets be 
placed in jeopardy is the argument that such a provision would deter 
qualified directors from serving. When considered carefully, however, this 
argument seems a red herring. Many high-risk activities are accompanied by 
the threat of liability for negligent action. Nonetheless, many intelligent 
people continue to engage in such activities. As examples, doctors, lawyers, 
and accountants continue to practice their professions despite the risk of 
significant malpractice liability. Although such professionals can insure 
themselves against some of these risks, they typically bear the costs of 
increases in premiums related to their own claims histories. 
More specifically, however, this proposed liability reform is aimed at 
relieving directors of the speculative risk of limitless liability, and should 
thus provide comfort to skittish directors. It provides complete protection of 
each director’s primary residence and retirement assets, regardless of 
value—assets that form the basis of financial security. It also ensures the 
protection of the vast proportion of directors’ remaining assets (eighty 
percent in WorldCom), no matter how grand or modest. What likely worries 
directors most is unpredictable, ruinous financial liability, rather than the 
risk of liability itself. Calibrated sanctions for negligent action squarely 
address such concerns. 
It is also important to note that WorldCom was unique in terms of the 
magnitude of investor losses and the strength of evidence of director 
negligence, which would have hindered the directors’ assertion of a due 
diligence defense.293 For these reasons, the twenty percent of net worth 
figure for assessing personal contributions represents a high-water mark for 
directors’ personal payments. In a less egregious case, a smaller proportion 
of assets would be an appropriate penalty. Accountability can be enhanced 
whenever directors have to make personal payments. The specific amount of 
such payments is less important than their very existence. 
Some critics may also question whether the recommended reforms 
represent the best approach to enhancing director accountability. For 
example, proxy reforms that empower shareholders to more easily replace 
directors could enhance director accountability. Such reforms may be 
preferable to relying on ex post litigation to remedy poor decisions. 
Although shareholder voting reforms represent important avenues for 
promoting accountability among corporate leaders, revitalizing shareholder 
 
 293. Black et al. II, supra note 41, at 1128 (describing WorldCom and Enron as “perfect 
storm” scenarios for out-of-pocket payouts by outside directors). 
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litigation remains an essential step in restoring meaning to the concept of 
fiduciary duty.294 
The adoption of a net-worth-based determination of damages for 
negligent directors may also require abandoning the tort-based 
compensatory scheme which underlies corporate liability theory.295 In light 
of widely expressed doubts about shareholder litigation’s potential as a 
compensatory mechanism, the explicit shift in objectives may be overdue.296 
The compensation objective is ill-served under the current regime. The 
circularity of payments—from company to insurer in the form of premiums 
and then from insurer to the company in settlement of a derivative claims—
is perverse.297 In addition, the high volume of trading in corporate securities 
means that the shareholders who benefit at the time a corporation receives 
recovery are not necessarily the same individuals who suffered from the 
wrongdoing. For these reasons and others, explicitly acknowledging 
shareholder litigation’s primary objectives as providing accountability and 
deterrence is warranted.298 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because neither markets nor social norms can induce ideal conduct 
from corporate directors, a credible accountability mechanism is necessary 
to provide an external check on managerial overreaching. Shareholder 
litigation, if properly reformed, could serve as an effective accountability 
mechanism. However, in order to motivate directors to attend diligently to 
their duties, judges must do more than chide misguided directors in their 
opinions. They must also demonstrate a willingness to find liability when 
director conduct falls short of acceptable standards. 
The proposed reforms to director liability standards can best be 
achieved through changes in settlement practices in derivative litigation. 
More and more securities fraud settlements have required structural 
 
 294. Others may argue that vigorous enforcement of the duty of care would inappropriately 
disadvantage important corporate constituencies such as employees and creditors by 
encouraging shareholders to “use lawsuits as strategic devices to extract rents.” Margaret Blair & 
Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 300 (1999). In 
addition, certain types of shareholders (such as hedge funds and mutual funds that pursue 
short term strategies) may use lawsuits to pursue private objectives at the expense of longer-
term investors. See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006). While curbing abuse of shareholder litigation is an important 
concern, it should not distract attention from the important need for directors to be 
accountable to somebody. In the system promoted here, directors would ultimately be 
accountable to courts rather than shareholders, although shareholders would retain sole power 
to seek judicial review of questionable corporate actions. 
 295. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 250, at 302–05. 
 296. Id. at 302; Alexander, supra note 267, at 1500–07; Roberta Romano, The Shareholder 
Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84–85 (1991). 
 297. Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 251, at 648–50. 
 298. Id. at 643–51. 
JONES_FINAL_REVISED 11/20/2006 4:51:51 PM 
158 92  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2006] 
corporate governance reforms and personal payments from culpable wrong-
doers.299 The absence of lead-plaintiff provisions in corporate law means 
institutional investors lack bargaining power to initiate such reforms. 
However, judges could insist on greater director accountability when 
reviewing preliminary motions and proposed settlements.300 Judges have 
wide discretion in ruling on settlement proposals and in deciding whether a 
case will proceed to discovery or trial. In reviewing settlements, judges 
should reject proposals that do not include personal payments by executives 
or directors where credible evidence exists of misconduct or gross 
negligence. Judges should also indicate a strong risk of liability in 
appropriate cases in order to persuade directors and other individual 
defendants to agree to out-of-pocket payments. 
Reducing the weight of prospective liability might encourage judges to 
impose liability more often. Linking directors’ personal contributions to 
settlements to their ability to pay could also reduce the perceived unfairness 
of the existing liability scheme. If director liability provisions were more 
widely perceived as fair (by directors and society in general), directors would 
be more likely to heed the values commended to them by courts and 
commentators. 
 
 299. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), created most adequate plaintiff requirements for 
class action securities claims, under which the shareholder with the most money at stake in the 
claim is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
21(D)(a)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(b) (2000). In response to this new law, plaintiffs’ firms 
sought alliances with institutional investors to represent these large shareholders in cases 
affecting their portfolio securities. In addition to monetary compensation, many institutional 
investors, acting in their roles as lead plaintiffs, also seek to institute corporate governance 
reforms that might mitigate the recurrence of fraud in the future. Some scholars recommend 
that state courts adopt lead plaintiff provisions. See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, Litigation 
Agency Costs, supra note 54, at 7, 64. Such reforms might be helpful in eliminating the so-called 
“race to the courthouse” and in facilitating institutional shareholder control over plaintiff 
attorneys. 
 300. Insurers might also have the power to lead such a reform effort. Insurers have sound 
business reasons to create incentives for good management practices in accordance with 
fiduciary duties to minimize payouts required under existing policies. Their expertise can be 
brought to bear through contract terms allocating deductibles, exclusions, and co-payments. 
